forked from forgejo/forgejo
[GITEA] rework long-term authentication
- The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can
construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in
the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is
dumped/leaked.
- This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies).
- Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works.
- Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore.
(cherry-pick from eff097448b
)
Conflicts:
modules/context/context_cookie.go
trivial context conflicts
routers/web/web.go
ctx.GetSiteCookie(setting.CookieRememberName) moved from services/auth/middleware.go
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parent
3759c1a7c1
commit
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15 changed files with 338 additions and 154 deletions
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@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
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package util
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import (
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/rand"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"testing"
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@ -37,21 +35,3 @@ func TestCopyFile(t *testing.T) {
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, testContent, dstContent)
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}
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func TestAESGCM(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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key := make([]byte, aes.BlockSize)
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_, err := rand.Read(key)
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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plaintext := []byte("this will be encrypted")
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ciphertext, err := AESGCMEncrypt(key, plaintext)
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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decrypted, err := AESGCMDecrypt(key, ciphertext)
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, plaintext, decrypted)
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}
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