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go1.16 (#14783)

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techknowlogick 2021-02-28 18:08:33 -05:00 • committed by GitHub
parent 030646eea4
commit 47f6a4ec3f
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
947 changed files with 26119 additions and 7062 deletions
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158
vendor/github.com/miekg/dns/tsig.go generated vendored
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@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package dns
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/md5"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/sha512"
@ -16,12 +15,65 @@ import (
// HMAC hashing codes. These are transmitted as domain names.
const (
HmacMD5 = "hmac-md5.sig-alg.reg.int."
HmacSHA1 = "hmac-sha1."
HmacSHA224 = "hmac-sha224."
HmacSHA256 = "hmac-sha256."
HmacSHA384 = "hmac-sha384."
HmacSHA512 = "hmac-sha512."
HmacMD5 = "hmac-md5.sig-alg.reg.int." // Deprecated: HmacMD5 is no longer supported.
)
// TsigProvider provides the API to plug-in a custom TSIG implementation.
type TsigProvider interface {
// Generate is passed the DNS message to be signed and the partial TSIG RR. It returns the signature and nil, otherwise an error.
Generate(msg []byte, t *TSIG) ([]byte, error)
// Verify is passed the DNS message to be verified and the TSIG RR. If the signature is valid it will return nil, otherwise an error.
Verify(msg []byte, t *TSIG) error
}
type tsigHMACProvider string
func (key tsigHMACProvider) Generate(msg []byte, t *TSIG) ([]byte, error) {
// If we barf here, the caller is to blame
rawsecret, err := fromBase64([]byte(key))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var h hash.Hash
switch CanonicalName(t.Algorithm) {
case HmacSHA1:
h = hmac.New(sha1.New, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA224:
h = hmac.New(sha256.New224, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA256:
h = hmac.New(sha256.New, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA384:
h = hmac.New(sha512.New384, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA512:
h = hmac.New(sha512.New, rawsecret)
default:
return nil, ErrKeyAlg
}
h.Write(msg)
return h.Sum(nil), nil
}
func (key tsigHMACProvider) Verify(msg []byte, t *TSIG) error {
b, err := key.Generate(msg, t)
if err != nil {
return err
}
mac, err := hex.DecodeString(t.MAC)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !hmac.Equal(b, mac) {
return ErrSig
}
return nil
}
// TSIG is the RR the holds the transaction signature of a message.
// See RFC 2845 and RFC 4635.
type TSIG struct {
@ -54,8 +106,8 @@ func (rr *TSIG) String() string {
return s
}
func (rr *TSIG) parse(c *zlexer, origin string) *ParseError {
panic("dns: internal error: parse should never be called on TSIG")
func (*TSIG) parse(c *zlexer, origin string) *ParseError {
return &ParseError{err: "TSIG records do not have a presentation format"}
}
// The following values must be put in wireformat, so that the MAC can be calculated.
@ -96,14 +148,13 @@ type timerWireFmt struct {
// timersOnly is false.
// If something goes wrong an error is returned, otherwise it is nil.
func TsigGenerate(m *Msg, secret, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) ([]byte, string, error) {
return tsigGenerateProvider(m, tsigHMACProvider(secret), requestMAC, timersOnly)
}
func tsigGenerateProvider(m *Msg, provider TsigProvider, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) ([]byte, string, error) {
if m.IsTsig() == nil {
panic("dns: TSIG not last RR in additional")
}
// If we barf here, the caller is to blame
rawsecret, err := fromBase64([]byte(secret))
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
rr := m.Extra[len(m.Extra)-1].(*TSIG)
m.Extra = m.Extra[0 : len(m.Extra)-1] // kill the TSIG from the msg
@ -111,32 +162,21 @@ func TsigGenerate(m *Msg, secret, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) ([]byte, s
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
buf := tsigBuffer(mbuf, rr, requestMAC, timersOnly)
buf, err := tsigBuffer(mbuf, rr, requestMAC, timersOnly)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
t := new(TSIG)
var h hash.Hash
switch CanonicalName(rr.Algorithm) {
case HmacMD5:
h = hmac.New(md5.New, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA1:
h = hmac.New(sha1.New, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA256:
h = hmac.New(sha256.New, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA512:
h = hmac.New(sha512.New, rawsecret)
default:
return nil, "", ErrKeyAlg
// Copy all TSIG fields except MAC and its size, which are filled using the computed digest.
*t = *rr
mac, err := provider.Generate(buf, rr)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
h.Write(buf)
t.MAC = hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))
t.MAC = hex.EncodeToString(mac)
t.MACSize = uint16(len(t.MAC) / 2) // Size is half!
t.Hdr = RR_Header{Name: rr.Hdr.Name, Rrtype: TypeTSIG, Class: ClassANY, Ttl: 0}
t.Fudge = rr.Fudge
t.TimeSigned = rr.TimeSigned
t.Algorithm = rr.Algorithm
t.OrigId = m.Id
tbuf := make([]byte, Len(t))
off, err := PackRR(t, tbuf, 0, nil, false)
if err != nil {
@ -153,26 +193,34 @@ func TsigGenerate(m *Msg, secret, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) ([]byte, s
// If the signature does not validate err contains the
// error, otherwise it is nil.
func TsigVerify(msg []byte, secret, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) error {
rawsecret, err := fromBase64([]byte(secret))
if err != nil {
return err
}
return tsigVerify(msg, tsigHMACProvider(secret), requestMAC, timersOnly, uint64(time.Now().Unix()))
}
func tsigVerifyProvider(msg []byte, provider TsigProvider, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) error {
return tsigVerify(msg, provider, requestMAC, timersOnly, uint64(time.Now().Unix()))
}
// actual implementation of TsigVerify, taking the current time ('now') as a parameter for the convenience of tests.
func tsigVerify(msg []byte, provider TsigProvider, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool, now uint64) error {
// Strip the TSIG from the incoming msg
stripped, tsig, err := stripTsig(msg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
msgMAC, err := hex.DecodeString(tsig.MAC)
buf, err := tsigBuffer(stripped, tsig, requestMAC, timersOnly)
if err != nil {
return err
}
buf := tsigBuffer(stripped, tsig, requestMAC, timersOnly)
if err := provider.Verify(buf, tsig); err != nil {
return err
}
// Fudge factor works both ways. A message can arrive before it was signed because
// of clock skew.
now := uint64(time.Now().Unix())
// We check this after verifying the signature, following draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc2845bis
// instead of RFC2845, in order to prevent a security vulnerability as reported in CVE-2017-3142/3143.
ti := now - tsig.TimeSigned
if now < tsig.TimeSigned {
ti = tsig.TimeSigned - now
@ -181,28 +229,11 @@ func TsigVerify(msg []byte, secret, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) error {
return ErrTime
}
var h hash.Hash
switch CanonicalName(tsig.Algorithm) {
case HmacMD5:
h = hmac.New(md5.New, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA1:
h = hmac.New(sha1.New, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA256:
h = hmac.New(sha256.New, rawsecret)
case HmacSHA512:
h = hmac.New(sha512.New, rawsecret)
default:
return ErrKeyAlg
}
h.Write(buf)
if !hmac.Equal(h.Sum(nil), msgMAC) {
return ErrSig
}
return nil
}
// Create a wiredata buffer for the MAC calculation.
func tsigBuffer(msgbuf []byte, rr *TSIG, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) []byte {
func tsigBuffer(msgbuf []byte, rr *TSIG, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) ([]byte, error) {
var buf []byte
if rr.TimeSigned == 0 {
rr.TimeSigned = uint64(time.Now().Unix())
@ -219,7 +250,10 @@ func tsigBuffer(msgbuf []byte, rr *TSIG, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) []b
m.MACSize = uint16(len(requestMAC) / 2)
m.MAC = requestMAC
buf = make([]byte, len(requestMAC)) // long enough
n, _ := packMacWire(m, buf)
n, err := packMacWire(m, buf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
buf = buf[:n]
}
@ -228,7 +262,10 @@ func tsigBuffer(msgbuf []byte, rr *TSIG, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) []b
tsig := new(timerWireFmt)
tsig.TimeSigned = rr.TimeSigned
tsig.Fudge = rr.Fudge
n, _ := packTimerWire(tsig, tsigvar)
n, err := packTimerWire(tsig, tsigvar)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tsigvar = tsigvar[:n]
} else {
tsig := new(tsigWireFmt)
@ -241,7 +278,10 @@ func tsigBuffer(msgbuf []byte, rr *TSIG, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) []b
tsig.Error = rr.Error
tsig.OtherLen = rr.OtherLen
tsig.OtherData = rr.OtherData
n, _ := packTsigWire(tsig, tsigvar)
n, err := packTsigWire(tsig, tsigvar)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tsigvar = tsigvar[:n]
}
@ -251,7 +291,7 @@ func tsigBuffer(msgbuf []byte, rr *TSIG, requestMAC string, timersOnly bool) []b
} else {
buf = append(msgbuf, tsigvar...)
}
return buf
return buf, nil
}
// Strip the TSIG from the raw message.