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Handle CORS requests (#6289)

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This commit is contained in:
Tamal Saha 2019-05-13 08:38:53 -07:00 • committed by techknowlogick
parent 6fb58a8cdc
commit 34d06f4c6b
170 changed files with 5220 additions and 2124 deletions
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43
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go generated vendored
View file

@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ const (
type Client struct {
// Key is the account key used to register with a CA and sign requests.
// Key.Public() must return a *rsa.PublicKey or *ecdsa.PublicKey.
//
// The following algorithms are supported:
// RS256, ES256, ES384 and ES512.
// See RFC7518 for more details about the algorithms.
Key crypto.Signer
// HTTPClient optionally specifies an HTTP client to use
@ -124,11 +128,7 @@ func (c *Client) Discover(ctx context.Context) (Directory, error) {
return *c.dir, nil
}
dirURL := c.DirectoryURL
if dirURL == "" {
dirURL = LetsEncryptURL
}
res, err := c.get(ctx, dirURL, wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
res, err := c.get(ctx, c.directoryURL(), wantStatus(http.StatusOK))
if err != nil {
return Directory{}, err
}
@ -161,6 +161,13 @@ func (c *Client) Discover(ctx context.Context) (Directory, error) {
return *c.dir, nil
}
func (c *Client) directoryURL() string {
if c.DirectoryURL != "" {
return c.DirectoryURL
}
return LetsEncryptURL
}
// CreateCert requests a new certificate using the Certificate Signing Request csr encoded in DER format.
// The exp argument indicates the desired certificate validity duration. CA may issue a certificate
// with a different duration.
@ -319,6 +326,20 @@ func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) {
// a valid authorization (Authorization.Status is StatusValid). If so, the caller
// need not fulfill any challenge and can proceed to requesting a certificate.
func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization, error) {
return c.authorize(ctx, "dns", domain)
}
// AuthorizeIP is the same as Authorize but requests IP address authorization.
// Clients which successfully obtain such authorization may request to issue
// a certificate for IP addresses.
//
// See the ACME spec extension for more details about IP address identifiers:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-ip.
func (c *Client) AuthorizeIP(ctx context.Context, ipaddr string) (*Authorization, error) {
return c.authorize(ctx, "ip", ipaddr)
}
func (c *Client) authorize(ctx context.Context, typ, val string) (*Authorization, error) {
if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -332,7 +353,7 @@ func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization,
Identifier authzID `json:"identifier"`
}{
Resource: "new-authz",
Identifier: authzID{Type: "dns", Value: domain},
Identifier: authzID{Type: typ, Value: val},
}
res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.AuthzURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated))
if err != nil {
@ -693,12 +714,18 @@ func (c *Client) doReg(ctx context.Context, url string, typ string, acct *Accoun
}
// popNonce returns a nonce value previously stored with c.addNonce
// or fetches a fresh one from the given URL.
// or fetches a fresh one from a URL by issuing a HEAD request.
// It first tries c.directoryURL() and then the provided url if the former fails.
func (c *Client) popNonce(ctx context.Context, url string) (string, error) {
c.noncesMu.Lock()
defer c.noncesMu.Unlock()
if len(c.nonces) == 0 {
return c.fetchNonce(ctx, url)
dirURL := c.directoryURL()
v, err := c.fetchNonce(ctx, dirURL)
if err != nil && url != dirURL {
v, err = c.fetchNonce(ctx, url)
}
return v, err
}
var nonce string
for nonce = range c.nonces {

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go generated vendored
View file

@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func HostWhitelist(hosts ...string) HostPolicy {
}
return func(_ context.Context, host string) error {
if !whitelist[host] {
return errors.New("acme/autocert: host not configured")
return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: host %q not configured in HostWhitelist", host)
}
return nil
}

29
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go generated vendored
View file

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, nonce string) ([]byt
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
alg, sha := jwsHasher(key)
alg, sha := jwsHasher(key.Public())
if alg == "" || !sha.Available() {
return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
}
@ -97,13 +97,16 @@ func jwkEncode(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
}
// jwsSign signs the digest using the given key.
// It returns ErrUnsupportedKey if the key type is unknown.
// The hash is used only for RSA keys.
// The hash is unused for ECDSA keys.
//
// Note: non-stdlib crypto.Signer implementations are expected to return
// the signature in the format as specified in RFC7518.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518 for more details.
func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error) {
switch key := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash)
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
if key, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey); ok {
// The key.Sign method of ecdsa returns ASN1-encoded signature.
// So, we use the package Sign function instead
// to get R and S values directly and format the result accordingly.
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, digest)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -118,18 +121,18 @@ func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error)
copy(sig[size*2-len(sb):], sb)
return sig, nil
}
return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash)
}
// jwsHasher indicates suitable JWS algorithm name and a hash function
// to use for signing a digest with the provided key.
// It returns ("", 0) if the key is not supported.
func jwsHasher(key crypto.Signer) (string, crypto.Hash) {
switch key := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
func jwsHasher(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, crypto.Hash) {
switch pub := pub.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
return "RS256", crypto.SHA256
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
switch key.Params().Name {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
switch pub.Params().Name {
case "P-256":
return "ES256", crypto.SHA256
case "P-384":

8
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/cipher.go generated vendored
View file

@ -3,6 +3,14 @@
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package blowfish implements Bruce Schneier's Blowfish encryption algorithm.
//
// Blowfish is a legacy cipher and its short block size makes it vulnerable to
// birthday bound attacks (see https://sweet32.info). It should only be used
// where compatibility with legacy systems, not security, is the goal.
//
// Deprecated: any new system should use AES (from crypto/aes, if necessary in
// an AEAD mode like crypto/cipher.NewGCM) or XChaCha20-Poly1305 (from
// golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305).
package blowfish // import "golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish"
// The code is a port of Bruce Schneier's C implementation.

11
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cast5/cast5.go generated vendored
View file

@ -2,8 +2,15 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package cast5 implements CAST5, as defined in RFC 2144. CAST5 is a common
// OpenPGP cipher.
// Package cast5 implements CAST5, as defined in RFC 2144.
//
// CAST5 is a legacy cipher and its short block size makes it vulnerable to
// birthday bound attacks (see https://sweet32.info). It should only be used
// where compatibility with legacy systems, not security, is the goal.
//
// Deprecated: any new system should use AES (from crypto/aes, if necessary in
// an AEAD mode like crypto/cipher.NewGCM) or XChaCha20-Poly1305 (from
// golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305).
package cast5 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/cast5"
import "errors"

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go generated vendored
View file

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func feFromBytes(dst *fieldElement, src *[32]byte) {
h6 := load3(src[20:]) << 7
h7 := load3(src[23:]) << 5
h8 := load3(src[26:]) << 4
h9 := load3(src[29:]) << 2
h9 := (load3(src[29:]) & 0x7fffff) << 2
var carry [10]int64
carry[9] = (h9 + 1<<24) >> 25

90
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/ladderstep_amd64.s generated vendored
View file

@ -121,18 +121,18 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
ADDQ AX,R12
ADCQ DX,R13
MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX
SHLQ $13,CX:SI
SHLQ $13,SI,CX
ANDQ DX,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ DX,R8
ADDQ CX,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ DX,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ DX,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ DX,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX
@ -236,18 +236,18 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
ADDQ AX,R12
ADCQ DX,R13
MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX
SHLQ $13,CX:SI
SHLQ $13,SI,CX
ANDQ DX,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ DX,R8
ADDQ CX,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ DX,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ DX,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ DX,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX
@ -441,18 +441,18 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
ADDQ AX,R12
ADCQ DX,R13
MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX
SHLQ $13,CX:SI
SHLQ $13,SI,CX
ANDQ DX,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ DX,R8
ADDQ CX,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ DX,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ DX,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ DX,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX
@ -591,18 +591,18 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
ADDQ AX,R12
ADCQ DX,R13
MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX
SHLQ $13,CX:SI
SHLQ $13,SI,CX
ANDQ DX,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ DX,R8
ADDQ CX,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ DX,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ DX,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ DX,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX
@ -731,18 +731,18 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
ADDQ AX,R12
ADCQ DX,R13
MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX
SHLQ $13,CX:SI
SHLQ $13,SI,CX
ANDQ DX,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ DX,R8
ADDQ CX,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ DX,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ DX,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ DX,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX
@ -846,18 +846,18 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
ADDQ AX,R12
ADCQ DX,R13
MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX
SHLQ $13,CX:SI
SHLQ $13,SI,CX
ANDQ DX,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ DX,R8
ADDQ CX,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ DX,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ DX,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ DX,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX
@ -996,18 +996,18 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
ADDQ AX,R12
ADCQ DX,R13
MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX
SHLQ $13,CX:SI
SHLQ $13,SI,CX
ANDQ DX,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ DX,R8
ADDQ CX,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ DX,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ DX,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ DX,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX
@ -1146,18 +1146,18 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
ADDQ AX,R12
ADCQ DX,R13
MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX
SHLQ $13,CX:SI
SHLQ $13,SI,CX
ANDQ DX,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ DX,R8
ADDQ CX,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ DX,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ DX,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ DX,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX
@ -1332,18 +1332,18 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8
ADDQ AX,R12
ADCQ DX,R13
MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX
SHLQ $13,CX:SI
SHLQ $13,SI,CX
ANDQ DX,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ DX,R8
ADDQ CX,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ DX,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ DX,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ DX,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX

10
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/mul_amd64.s generated vendored
View file

@ -124,18 +124,18 @@ TEXT ·mul(SB),0,$16-24
ADDQ AX,R14
ADCQ DX,R15
MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI
SHLQ $13,R9:R8
SHLQ $13,R8,R9
ANDQ SI,R8
SHLQ $13,R11:R10
SHLQ $13,R10,R11
ANDQ SI,R10
ADDQ R9,R10
SHLQ $13,R13:R12
SHLQ $13,R12,R13
ANDQ SI,R12
ADDQ R11,R12
SHLQ $13,R15:R14
SHLQ $13,R14,R15
ANDQ SI,R14
ADDQ R13,R14
SHLQ $13,BP:BX
SHLQ $13,BX,BP
ANDQ SI,BX
ADDQ R15,BX
IMUL3Q $19,BP,DX

10
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/square_amd64.s generated vendored
View file

@ -87,18 +87,18 @@ TEXT ·square(SB),7,$0-16
ADDQ AX,R13
ADCQ DX,R14
MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI
SHLQ $13,R8:CX
SHLQ $13,CX,R8
ANDQ SI,CX
SHLQ $13,R10:R9
SHLQ $13,R9,R10
ANDQ SI,R9
ADDQ R8,R9
SHLQ $13,R12:R11
SHLQ $13,R11,R12
ANDQ SI,R11
ADDQ R10,R11
SHLQ $13,R14:R13
SHLQ $13,R13,R14
ANDQ SI,R13
ADDQ R12,R13
SHLQ $13,BX:R15
SHLQ $13,R15,BX
ANDQ SI,R15
ADDQ R14,R15
IMUL3Q $19,BX,DX

308
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/asm_arm64.s generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.11
// +build !gccgo,!appengine
#include "textflag.h"
#define NUM_ROUNDS 10
// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
MOVD dst+0(FP), R1
MOVD src+24(FP), R2
MOVD src_len+32(FP), R3
MOVD key+48(FP), R4
MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6
MOVD counter+64(FP), R7
MOVD $·constants(SB), R10
MOVD $·incRotMatrix(SB), R11
MOVW (R7), R20
AND $~255, R3, R13
ADD R2, R13, R12 // R12 for block end
AND $255, R3, R13
loop:
MOVD $NUM_ROUNDS, R21
VLD1 (R11), [V30.S4, V31.S4]
// load contants
// VLD4R (R10), [V0.S4, V1.S4, V2.S4, V3.S4]
WORD $0x4D60E940
// load keys
// VLD4R 16(R4), [V4.S4, V5.S4, V6.S4, V7.S4]
WORD $0x4DFFE884
// VLD4R 16(R4), [V8.S4, V9.S4, V10.S4, V11.S4]
WORD $0x4DFFE888
SUB $32, R4
// load counter + nonce
// VLD1R (R7), [V12.S4]
WORD $0x4D40C8EC
// VLD3R (R6), [V13.S4, V14.S4, V15.S4]
WORD $0x4D40E8CD
// update counter
VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4
chacha:
// V0..V3 += V4..V7
// V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 16)
VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4
VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4
VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4
VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4
VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16
VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16
VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16
VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16
VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8
VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8
VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8
VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8
// V8..V11 += V12..V15
// V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 12)
VADD V8.S4, V12.S4, V8.S4
VADD V9.S4, V13.S4, V9.S4
VADD V10.S4, V14.S4, V10.S4
VADD V11.S4, V15.S4, V11.S4
VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16
VSHL $12, V16.S4, V4.S4
VSHL $12, V17.S4, V5.S4
VSHL $12, V18.S4, V6.S4
VSHL $12, V19.S4, V7.S4
VSRI $20, V16.S4, V4.S4
VSRI $20, V17.S4, V5.S4
VSRI $20, V18.S4, V6.S4
VSRI $20, V19.S4, V7.S4
// V0..V3 += V4..V7
// V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 8)
VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4
VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4
VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4
VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4
VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16
VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16
VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16
VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16
// V8..V11 += V12..V15
// V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 7)
VADD V12.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4
VADD V13.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4
VADD V14.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4
VADD V15.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4
VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16
VSHL $7, V16.S4, V4.S4
VSHL $7, V17.S4, V5.S4
VSHL $7, V18.S4, V6.S4
VSHL $7, V19.S4, V7.S4
VSRI $25, V16.S4, V4.S4
VSRI $25, V17.S4, V5.S4
VSRI $25, V18.S4, V6.S4
VSRI $25, V19.S4, V7.S4
// V0..V3 += V5..V7, V4
// V15,V12-V14 <<<= ((V15,V12-V14 XOR V0..V3), 16)
VADD V0.S4, V5.S4, V0.S4
VADD V1.S4, V6.S4, V1.S4
VADD V2.S4, V7.S4, V2.S4
VADD V3.S4, V4.S4, V3.S4
VEOR V15.B16, V0.B16, V15.B16
VEOR V12.B16, V1.B16, V12.B16
VEOR V13.B16, V2.B16, V13.B16
VEOR V14.B16, V3.B16, V14.B16
VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8
VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8
VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8
VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8
// V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 12)
// ...
VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4
VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4
VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4
VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4
VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16
VSHL $12, V16.S4, V5.S4
VSHL $12, V17.S4, V6.S4
VSHL $12, V18.S4, V7.S4
VSHL $12, V19.S4, V4.S4
VSRI $20, V16.S4, V5.S4
VSRI $20, V17.S4, V6.S4
VSRI $20, V18.S4, V7.S4
VSRI $20, V19.S4, V4.S4
// V0 += V5; V15 <<<= ((V0 XOR V15), 8)
// ...
VADD V5.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4
VADD V6.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4
VADD V7.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4
VADD V4.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4
VEOR V0.B16, V15.B16, V15.B16
VEOR V1.B16, V12.B16, V12.B16
VEOR V2.B16, V13.B16, V13.B16
VEOR V3.B16, V14.B16, V14.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16
VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16
// V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 7)
// ...
VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4
VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4
VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4
VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4
VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16
VSHL $7, V16.S4, V5.S4
VSHL $7, V17.S4, V6.S4
VSHL $7, V18.S4, V7.S4
VSHL $7, V19.S4, V4.S4
VSRI $25, V16.S4, V5.S4
VSRI $25, V17.S4, V6.S4
VSRI $25, V18.S4, V7.S4
VSRI $25, V19.S4, V4.S4
SUB $1, R21
CBNZ R21, chacha
// VLD4R (R10), [V16.S4, V17.S4, V18.S4, V19.S4]
WORD $0x4D60E950
// VLD4R 16(R4), [V20.S4, V21.S4, V22.S4, V23.S4]
WORD $0x4DFFE894
VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4
VADD V16.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4
VADD V17.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4
VADD V18.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4
VADD V19.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4
// VLD4R 16(R4), [V24.S4, V25.S4, V26.S4, V27.S4]
WORD $0x4DFFE898
// restore R4
SUB $32, R4
// load counter + nonce
// VLD1R (R7), [V28.S4]
WORD $0x4D40C8FC
// VLD3R (R6), [V29.S4, V30.S4, V31.S4]
WORD $0x4D40E8DD
VADD V20.S4, V4.S4, V4.S4
VADD V21.S4, V5.S4, V5.S4
VADD V22.S4, V6.S4, V6.S4
VADD V23.S4, V7.S4, V7.S4
VADD V24.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4
VADD V25.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4
VADD V26.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4
VADD V27.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4
VADD V28.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4
VADD V29.S4, V13.S4, V13.S4
VADD V30.S4, V14.S4, V14.S4
VADD V31.S4, V15.S4, V15.S4
VZIP1 V1.S4, V0.S4, V16.S4
VZIP2 V1.S4, V0.S4, V17.S4
VZIP1 V3.S4, V2.S4, V18.S4
VZIP2 V3.S4, V2.S4, V19.S4
VZIP1 V5.S4, V4.S4, V20.S4
VZIP2 V5.S4, V4.S4, V21.S4
VZIP1 V7.S4, V6.S4, V22.S4
VZIP2 V7.S4, V6.S4, V23.S4
VZIP1 V9.S4, V8.S4, V24.S4
VZIP2 V9.S4, V8.S4, V25.S4
VZIP1 V11.S4, V10.S4, V26.S4
VZIP2 V11.S4, V10.S4, V27.S4
VZIP1 V13.S4, V12.S4, V28.S4
VZIP2 V13.S4, V12.S4, V29.S4
VZIP1 V15.S4, V14.S4, V30.S4
VZIP2 V15.S4, V14.S4, V31.S4
VZIP1 V18.D2, V16.D2, V0.D2
VZIP2 V18.D2, V16.D2, V4.D2
VZIP1 V19.D2, V17.D2, V8.D2
VZIP2 V19.D2, V17.D2, V12.D2
VLD1.P 64(R2), [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16]
VZIP1 V22.D2, V20.D2, V1.D2
VZIP2 V22.D2, V20.D2, V5.D2
VZIP1 V23.D2, V21.D2, V9.D2
VZIP2 V23.D2, V21.D2, V13.D2
VLD1.P 64(R2), [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16]
VZIP1 V26.D2, V24.D2, V2.D2
VZIP2 V26.D2, V24.D2, V6.D2
VZIP1 V27.D2, V25.D2, V10.D2
VZIP2 V27.D2, V25.D2, V14.D2
VLD1.P 64(R2), [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16]
VZIP1 V30.D2, V28.D2, V3.D2
VZIP2 V30.D2, V28.D2, V7.D2
VZIP1 V31.D2, V29.D2, V11.D2
VZIP2 V31.D2, V29.D2, V15.D2
VLD1.P 64(R2), [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16]
VEOR V0.B16, V16.B16, V16.B16
VEOR V1.B16, V17.B16, V17.B16
VEOR V2.B16, V18.B16, V18.B16
VEOR V3.B16, V19.B16, V19.B16
VST1.P [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16], 64(R1)
VEOR V4.B16, V20.B16, V20.B16
VEOR V5.B16, V21.B16, V21.B16
VEOR V6.B16, V22.B16, V22.B16
VEOR V7.B16, V23.B16, V23.B16
VST1.P [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16], 64(R1)
VEOR V8.B16, V24.B16, V24.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V25.B16, V25.B16
VEOR V10.B16, V26.B16, V26.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V27.B16, V27.B16
VST1.P [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16], 64(R1)
VEOR V12.B16, V28.B16, V28.B16
VEOR V13.B16, V29.B16, V29.B16
VEOR V14.B16, V30.B16, V30.B16
VEOR V15.B16, V31.B16, V31.B16
VST1.P [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16], 64(R1)
ADD $4, R20
MOVW R20, (R7) // update counter
CMP R2, R12
BGT loop
RET
DATA ·constants+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865
DATA ·constants+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e
DATA ·constants+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32
DATA ·constants+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574
GLOBL ·constants(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x00(SB)/4, $0x00000000
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x04(SB)/4, $0x00000001
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x08(SB)/4, $0x00000002
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x00000003
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x10(SB)/4, $0x02010003
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x14(SB)/4, $0x06050407
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x18(SB)/4, $0x0A09080B
DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x0E0D0C0F
GLOBL ·incRotMatrix(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32

31
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.11
// +build !gccgo
package chacha20
const (
haveAsm = true
bufSize = 256
)
//go:noescape
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
if len(src) >= bufSize {
xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter)
}
if len(src)%bufSize != 0 {
i := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
c.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
copy(c.buf[:], src[i:])
xorKeyStreamVX(c.buf[:], c.buf[:], &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter)
c.len = bufSize - copy(dst[i:], c.buf[:len(src)%bufSize])
}
}

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go generated vendored
View file

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !s390x gccgo appengine
// +build !arm64,!s390x arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine
package chacha20

11
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go generated vendored
View file

@ -6,15 +6,14 @@
package chacha20
var haveAsm = hasVectorFacility()
import (
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
)
var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX
const bufSize = 256
// hasVectorFacility reports whether the machine supports the vector
// facility (vx).
// Implementation in asm_s390x.s.
func hasVectorFacility() bool
// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only
// be called when the vector facility is available.
// Implementation in asm_s390x.s.

23
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s generated vendored
View file

@ -258,26 +258,3 @@ tail:
MOVD R8, R3
MOVD $0, R4
JMP continue
// func hasVectorFacility() bool
TEXT ·hasVectorFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1
MOVD $x-24(SP), R1
XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage
MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1
WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1)
XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0
MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1
AND $0x40, R1
BEQ novector
vectorinstalled:
// check if the vector instruction has been enabled
VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16
VLGVB $0, V16, R1
CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novector
MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx
RET
novector:
MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx
RET

4
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/md4/md4.go generated vendored
View file

@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package md4 implements the MD4 hash algorithm as defined in RFC 1320.
//
// Deprecated: MD4 is cryptographically broken and should should only be used
// where compatibility with legacy systems, not security, is the goal. Instead,
// use a secure hash like SHA-256 (from crypto/sha256).
package md4 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/md4"
import (

143
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/keys.go generated vendored
View file

@ -333,7 +333,6 @@ func ReadEntity(packets *packet.Reader) (*Entity, error) {
return nil, errors.StructuralError("primary key cannot be used for signatures")
}
var current *Identity
var revocations []*packet.Signature
EachPacket:
for {
@ -346,36 +345,8 @@ EachPacket:
switch pkt := p.(type) {
case *packet.UserId:
// Make a new Identity object, that we might wind up throwing away.
// We'll only add it if we get a valid self-signature over this
// userID.
current = new(Identity)
current.Name = pkt.Id
current.UserId = pkt
for {
p, err = packets.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break EachPacket
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
if !ok {
packets.Unread(p)
continue EachPacket
}
if (sig.SigType == packet.SigTypePositiveCert || sig.SigType == packet.SigTypeGenericCert) && sig.IssuerKeyId != nil && *sig.IssuerKeyId == e.PrimaryKey.KeyId {
if err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyUserIdSignature(pkt.Id, e.PrimaryKey, sig); err != nil {
return nil, errors.StructuralError("user ID self-signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
current.SelfSignature = sig
e.Identities[pkt.Id] = current
} else {
current.Signatures = append(current.Signatures, sig)
}
if err := addUserID(e, packets, pkt); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
case *packet.Signature:
if pkt.SigType == packet.SigTypeKeyRevocation {
@ -384,11 +355,9 @@ EachPacket:
// TODO: RFC4880 5.2.1 permits signatures
// directly on keys (eg. to bind additional
// revocation keys).
} else if current == nil {
return nil, errors.StructuralError("signature packet found before user id packet")
} else {
current.Signatures = append(current.Signatures, pkt)
}
// Else, ignoring the signature as it does not follow anything
// we would know to attach it to.
case *packet.PrivateKey:
if pkt.IsSubkey == false {
packets.Unread(p)
@ -429,33 +398,105 @@ EachPacket:
return e, nil
}
func addUserID(e *Entity, packets *packet.Reader, pkt *packet.UserId) error {
// Make a new Identity object, that we might wind up throwing away.
// We'll only add it if we get a valid self-signature over this
// userID.
identity := new(Identity)
identity.Name = pkt.Id
identity.UserId = pkt
for {
p, err := packets.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
} else if err != nil {
return err
}
sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
if !ok {
packets.Unread(p)
break
}
if (sig.SigType == packet.SigTypePositiveCert || sig.SigType == packet.SigTypeGenericCert) && sig.IssuerKeyId != nil && *sig.IssuerKeyId == e.PrimaryKey.KeyId {
if err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyUserIdSignature(pkt.Id, e.PrimaryKey, sig); err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("user ID self-signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
identity.SelfSignature = sig
e.Identities[pkt.Id] = identity
} else {
identity.Signatures = append(identity.Signatures, sig)
}
}
return nil
}
func addSubkey(e *Entity, packets *packet.Reader, pub *packet.PublicKey, priv *packet.PrivateKey) error {
var subKey Subkey
subKey.PublicKey = pub
subKey.PrivateKey = priv
p, err := packets.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
for {
p, err := packets.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
} else if err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
if !ok {
packets.Unread(p)
break
}
if sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding && sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature with wrong type")
}
if err := e.PrimaryKey.VerifyKeySignature(subKey.PublicKey, sig); err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
switch sig.SigType {
case packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation:
subKey.Sig = sig
case packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding:
if shouldReplaceSubkeySig(subKey.Sig, sig) {
subKey.Sig = sig
}
}
}
if err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
var ok bool
subKey.Sig, ok = p.(*packet.Signature)
if !ok {
if subKey.Sig == nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey packet not followed by signature")
}
if subKey.Sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding && subKey.Sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature with wrong type")
}
err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyKeySignature(subKey.PublicKey, subKey.Sig)
if err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
e.Subkeys = append(e.Subkeys, subKey)
return nil
}
func shouldReplaceSubkeySig(existingSig, potentialNewSig *packet.Signature) bool {
if potentialNewSig == nil {
return false
}
if existingSig == nil {
return true
}
if existingSig.SigType == packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
return false // never override a revocation signature
}
return potentialNewSig.CreationTime.After(existingSig.CreationTime)
}
const defaultRSAKeyBits = 2048
// NewEntity returns an Entity that contains a fresh RSA/RSA keypair with a

12
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go generated vendored
View file

@ -404,14 +404,16 @@ const (
type PublicKeyAlgorithm uint8
const (
PubKeyAlgoRSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 1
PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 2
PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 3
PubKeyAlgoElGamal PublicKeyAlgorithm = 16
PubKeyAlgoDSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 17
PubKeyAlgoRSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 1
PubKeyAlgoElGamal PublicKeyAlgorithm = 16
PubKeyAlgoDSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 17
// RFC 6637, Section 5.
PubKeyAlgoECDH PublicKeyAlgorithm = 18
PubKeyAlgoECDSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 19
// Deprecated in RFC 4880, Section 13.5. Use key flags instead.
PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 2
PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 3
)
// CanEncrypt returns true if it's possible to encrypt a message to a public

9
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go generated vendored
View file

@ -64,14 +64,19 @@ func NewECDSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateK
return pk
}
// NewSignerPrivateKey creates a sign-only PrivateKey from a crypto.Signer that
// NewSignerPrivateKey creates a PrivateKey from a crypto.Signer that
// implements RSA or ECDSA.
func NewSignerPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, signer crypto.Signer) *PrivateKey {
pk := new(PrivateKey)
// In general, the public Keys should be used as pointers. We still
// type-switch on the values, for backwards-compatibility.
switch pubkey := signer.Public().(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
case rsa.PublicKey:
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
pk.PubKeyAlgo = PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
case ecdsa.PublicKey:
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
default:

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/signature.go generated vendored
View file

@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ func (sig *Signature) Sign(h hash.Hash, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) (err e
r, s, err = ecdsa.Sign(config.Random(), pk, digest)
} else {
var b []byte
b, err = priv.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(config.Random(), digest, nil)
b, err = priv.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(config.Random(), digest, sig.Hash)
if err == nil {
r, s, err = unwrapECDSASig(b)
}

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/userattribute.go generated vendored
View file

@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ func (uat *UserAttribute) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
// ImageData returns zero or more byte slices, each containing
// JPEG File Interchange Format (JFIF), for each photo in the
// the user attribute packet.
// user attribute packet.
func (uat *UserAttribute) ImageData() (imageData [][]byte) {
for _, sp := range uat.Contents {
if sp.SubType == UserAttrImageSubpacket && len(sp.Contents) > 16 {

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/write.go generated vendored
View file

@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHint
// These are the possible hash functions that we'll use for the signature.
candidateHashes := []uint8{
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA256),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA384),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA512),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA1),
hashToHashId(crypto.RIPEMD160),
@ -349,6 +350,7 @@ func Sign(output io.Writer, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Con
// These are the possible hash functions that we'll use for the signature.
candidateHashes := []uint8{
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA256),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA384),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA512),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA1),
hashToHashId(crypto.RIPEMD160),

11
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !amd64 gccgo appengine
package poly1305
type mac struct{ macGeneric }
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) mac { return mac{newMACGeneric(key)} }

80
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go generated vendored
View file

@ -2,21 +2,19 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
/*
Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as
specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf.
Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an
attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a
key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different
messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other
messages with the same key.
Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was
used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce.
However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified
directly.
*/
// Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as
// specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf.
//
// Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an
// attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a
// key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different
// messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other
// messages with the same key.
//
// Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was
// used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce.
// However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified
// directly.
package poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
import "crypto/subtle"
@ -31,3 +29,55 @@ func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool {
Sum(&tmp, m, key)
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1
}
// New returns a new MAC computing an authentication
// tag of all data written to it with the given key.
// This allows writing the message progressively instead
// of passing it as a single slice. Common users should use
// the Sum function instead.
//
// The key must be unique for each message, as authenticating
// two different messages with the same key allows an attacker
// to forge messages at will.
func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC {
return &MAC{
mac: newMAC(key),
finalized: false,
}
}
// MAC is an io.Writer computing an authentication tag
// of the data written to it.
//
// MAC cannot be used like common hash.Hash implementations,
// because using a poly1305 key twice breaks its security.
// Therefore writing data to a running MAC after calling
// Sum causes it to panic.
type MAC struct {
mac // platform-dependent implementation
finalized bool
}
// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return.
func (h *MAC) Size() int { return TagSize }
// Write adds more data to the running message authentication code.
// It never returns an error.
//
// It must not be called after the first call of Sum.
func (h *MAC) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
if h.finalized {
panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum")
}
return h.mac.Write(p)
}
// Sum computes the authenticator of all data written to the
// message authentication code.
func (h *MAC) Sum(b []byte) []byte {
var mac [TagSize]byte
h.mac.Sum(&mac)
h.finalized = true
return append(b, mac[:]...)
}

60
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go generated vendored
View file

@ -6,17 +6,63 @@
package poly1305
// This function is implemented in sum_amd64.s
//go:noescape
func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
//go:noescape
func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
//go:noescape
func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
var mPtr *byte
if len(m) > 0 {
mPtr = &m[0]
}
poly1305(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)
h := newMAC(key)
h.Write(m)
h.Sum(out)
}
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
initialize(&h.state, key)
return
}
type mac struct {
state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 }
buffer [TagSize]byte
offset int
}
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = len(p)
if h.offset > 0 {
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
if n < remaining {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
return n, nil
}
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
p = p[remaining:]
h.offset = 0
update(&h.state, h.buffer[:])
}
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
update(&h.state, p[:nn])
p = p[nn:]
}
if len(p) > 0 {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
}
return n, nil
}
func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
state := h.state
if h.offset > 0 {
update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
}
finalize(out, &state)
}

61
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s generated vendored
View file

@ -58,20 +58,17 @@ DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
// func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key)
TEXT ·poly1305(SB), $0-32
MOVQ out+0(FP), DI
MOVQ m+8(FP), SI
MOVQ mlen+16(FP), R15
MOVQ key+24(FP), AX
// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32
MOVQ state+0(FP), DI
MOVQ msg_base+8(FP), SI
MOVQ msg_len+16(FP), R15
MOVQ 0(AX), R11
MOVQ 8(AX), R12
ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R11 // r0
ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>+8(SB), R12 // r1
XORQ R8, R8 // h0
XORQ R9, R9 // h1
XORQ R10, R10 // h2
MOVQ 0(DI), R8 // h0
MOVQ 8(DI), R9 // h1
MOVQ 16(DI), R10 // h2
MOVQ 24(DI), R11 // r0
MOVQ 32(DI), R12 // r1
CMPQ R15, $16
JB bytes_between_0_and_15
@ -109,16 +106,42 @@ flush_buffer:
JMP multiply
done:
MOVQ R8, AX
MOVQ R9, BX
MOVQ R8, 0(DI)
MOVQ R9, 8(DI)
MOVQ R10, 16(DI)
RET
// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16
MOVQ state+0(FP), DI
MOVQ key+8(FP), SI
// state[0...7] is initialized with zero
MOVOU 0(SI), X0
MOVOU 16(SI), X1
MOVOU ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), X2
PAND X2, X0
MOVOU X0, 24(DI)
MOVOU X1, 40(DI)
RET
// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16
MOVQ tag+0(FP), DI
MOVQ state+8(FP), SI
MOVQ 0(SI), AX
MOVQ 8(SI), BX
MOVQ 16(SI), CX
MOVQ AX, R8
MOVQ BX, R9
SUBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB, AX
SBBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, BX
SBBQ $3, R10
SBBQ $3, CX
CMOVQCS R8, AX
CMOVQCS R9, BX
MOVQ key+24(FP), R8
ADDQ 16(R8), AX
ADCQ 24(R8), BX
ADDQ 40(SI), AX
ADCQ 48(SI), BX
MOVQ AX, 0(DI)
MOVQ BX, 8(DI)

121
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
@ -6,21 +6,79 @@ package poly1305
import "encoding/binary"
const (
msgBlock = uint32(1 << 24)
finalBlock = uint32(0)
)
// sumGeneric generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and
// puts the 16-byte result into out. This is the generic implementation of
// Sum and should be called if no assembly implementation is available.
func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
var (
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 uint32 // the hash accumulators
r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 uint64 // the r part of the key
)
h := newMACGeneric(key)
h.Write(msg)
h.Sum(out)
}
r0 = uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff)
r1 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03)
r2 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff)
r3 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff)
r4 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff)
func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) (h macGeneric) {
h.r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
h.r[1] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03
h.r[2] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff
h.r[3] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff
h.r[4] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff
h.s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:])
h.s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:])
h.s[2] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:])
h.s[3] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:])
return
}
type macGeneric struct {
h, r [5]uint32
s [4]uint32
buffer [TagSize]byte
offset int
}
func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = len(p)
if h.offset > 0 {
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
if n < remaining {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
return n, nil
}
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
p = p[remaining:]
h.offset = 0
updateGeneric(h.buffer[:], msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r))
}
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
updateGeneric(p, msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r))
p = p[nn:]
}
if len(p) > 0 {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
}
return n, nil
}
func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
H, R := h.h, h.r
if h.offset > 0 {
var buffer [TagSize]byte
copy(buffer[:], h.buffer[:h.offset])
buffer[h.offset] = 1 // invariant: h.offset < TagSize
updateGeneric(buffer[:], finalBlock, &H, &R)
}
finalizeGeneric(out, &H, &(h.s))
}
func updateGeneric(msg []byte, flag uint32, h, r *[5]uint32) {
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4]
r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 := uint64(r[0]), uint64(r[1]), uint64(r[2]), uint64(r[3]), uint64(r[4])
R1, R2, R3, R4 := r1*5, r2*5, r3*5, r4*5
for len(msg) >= TagSize {
@ -29,7 +87,7 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | (1 << 24)
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | flag
// h *= r
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
@ -52,36 +110,11 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
msg = msg[TagSize:]
}
if len(msg) > 0 {
var block [TagSize]byte
off := copy(block[:], msg)
block[off] = 0x01
h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4] = h0, h1, h2, h3, h4
}
// h += msg
h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[12:]) >> 8)
// h *= r
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2)
d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3)
d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4)
d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0)
// h %= p
h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff
h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff
h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff
h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff
h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff
h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5
h1 += h0 >> 26
h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff
}
func finalizeGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[5]uint32, s *[4]uint32) {
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4]
// h %= p reduction
h2 += h1 >> 26
@ -123,13 +156,13 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
// s: the s part of the key
// tag = (h + s) % (2^128)
t := uint64(h0) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:]))
t := uint64(h0) + uint64(s[0])
h0 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h1) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:])) + (t >> 32)
t = uint64(h1) + uint64(s[1]) + (t >> 32)
h1 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h2) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:])) + (t >> 32)
t = uint64(h2) + uint64(s[2]) + (t >> 32)
h2 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h3) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:])) + (t >> 32)
t = uint64(h3) + uint64(s[3]) + (t >> 32)
h3 = uint32(t)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:], h0)

4
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go generated vendored
View file

@ -10,5 +10,7 @@ package poly1305
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
sumGeneric(out, msg, key)
h := newMAC(key)
h.Write(msg)
h.Sum(out)
}

17
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go generated vendored
View file

@ -6,16 +6,9 @@
package poly1305
// hasVectorFacility reports whether the machine supports
// the vector facility (vx).
func hasVectorFacility() bool
// hasVMSLFacility reports whether the machine supports
// Vector Multiply Sum Logical (VMSL).
func hasVMSLFacility() bool
var hasVX = hasVectorFacility()
var hasVMSL = hasVMSLFacility()
import (
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
)
// poly1305vx is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector
// instructions. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is
@ -33,12 +26,12 @@ func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
if hasVX {
if cpu.S390X.HasVX {
var mPtr *byte
if len(m) > 0 {
mPtr = &m[0]
}
if hasVMSL && len(m) > 256 {
if cpu.S390X.HasVXE && len(m) > 256 {
poly1305vmsl(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)
} else {
poly1305vx(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)

22
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.s generated vendored
View file

@ -376,25 +376,3 @@ b1:
MOVD $0, R3
BR multiply
TEXT ·hasVectorFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1
MOVD $x-24(SP), R1
XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage
MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1
WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1)
XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0
MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1
AND $0x40, R1
BEQ novector
vectorinstalled:
// check if the vector instruction has been enabled
VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16
VLGVB $0, V16, R1
CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novector
MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx
RET
novector:
MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx
RET

22
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_vmsl_s390x.s generated vendored
View file

@ -907,25 +907,3 @@ square:
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5)
BR next
TEXT ·hasVMSLFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1
MOVD $x-24(SP), R1
XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage
MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1
WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1)
XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0
MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1
AND $0x01, R1
BEQ novmsl
vectorinstalled:
// check if the vector instruction has been enabled
VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16
VLGVB $0, V16, R1
CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novmsl
MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx
RET
novmsl:
MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx
RET

120
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go generated vendored
View file

@ -25,10 +25,22 @@ import (
"math/big"
"sync"
"crypto"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
// SignatureFlags represent additional flags that can be passed to the signature
// requests an defined in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.5.1.
type SignatureFlags uint32
// SignatureFlag values as defined in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 5.3.
const (
SignatureFlagReserved SignatureFlags = 1 << iota
SignatureFlagRsaSha256
SignatureFlagRsaSha512
)
// Agent represents the capabilities of an ssh-agent.
type Agent interface {
// List returns the identities known to the agent.
@ -57,6 +69,26 @@ type Agent interface {
Signers() ([]ssh.Signer, error)
}
type ExtendedAgent interface {
Agent
// SignWithFlags signs like Sign, but allows for additional flags to be sent/received
SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureFlags) (*ssh.Signature, error)
// Extension processes a custom extension request. Standard-compliant agents are not
// required to support any extensions, but this method allows agents to implement
// vendor-specific methods or add experimental features. See [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7.
// If agent extensions are unsupported entirely this method MUST return an
// ErrExtensionUnsupported error. Similarly, if just the specific extensionType in
// the request is unsupported by the agent then ErrExtensionUnsupported MUST be
// returned.
//
// In the case of success, since [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 specifies that the contents
// of the response are unspecified (including the type of the message), the complete
// response will be returned as a []byte slice, including the "type" byte of the message.
Extension(extensionType string, contents []byte) ([]byte, error)
}
// ConstraintExtension describes an optional constraint defined by users.
type ConstraintExtension struct {
// ExtensionName consist of a UTF-8 string suffixed by the
@ -179,6 +211,23 @@ type constrainExtensionAgentMsg struct {
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 4.7
const agentExtension = 27
const agentExtensionFailure = 28
// ErrExtensionUnsupported indicates that an extension defined in
// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 is unsupported by the agent. Specifically this
// error indicates that the agent returned a standard SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message
// as the result of a SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION request. Note that the protocol
// specification (and therefore this error) does not distinguish between a
// specific extension being unsupported and extensions being unsupported entirely.
var ErrExtensionUnsupported = errors.New("agent: extension unsupported")
type extensionAgentMsg struct {
ExtensionType string `sshtype:"27"`
Contents []byte
}
// Key represents a protocol 2 public key as defined in
// [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.5.2.
type Key struct {
@ -260,7 +309,7 @@ type client struct {
// NewClient returns an Agent that talks to an ssh-agent process over
// the given connection.
func NewClient(rw io.ReadWriter) Agent {
func NewClient(rw io.ReadWriter) ExtendedAgent {
return &client{conn: rw}
}
@ -268,6 +317,21 @@ func NewClient(rw io.ReadWriter) Agent {
// unmarshaled into reply and replyType is set to the first byte of
// the reply, which contains the type of the message.
func (c *client) call(req []byte) (reply interface{}, err error) {
buf, err := c.callRaw(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
reply, err = unmarshal(buf)
if err != nil {
return nil, clientErr(err)
}
return reply, nil
}
// callRaw sends an RPC to the agent. On success, the raw
// bytes of the response are returned; no unmarshalling is
// performed on the response.
func (c *client) callRaw(req []byte) (reply []byte, err error) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
@ -284,18 +348,14 @@ func (c *client) call(req []byte) (reply interface{}, err error) {
}
respSize := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(respSizeBuf[:])
if respSize > maxAgentResponseBytes {
return nil, clientErr(err)
return nil, clientErr(errors.New("response too large"))
}
buf := make([]byte, respSize)
if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.conn, buf); err != nil {
return nil, clientErr(err)
}
reply, err = unmarshal(buf)
if err != nil {
return nil, clientErr(err)
}
return reply, err
return buf, nil
}
func (c *client) simpleCall(req []byte) error {
@ -369,9 +429,14 @@ func (c *client) List() ([]*Key, error) {
// Sign has the agent sign the data using a protocol 2 key as defined
// in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 2.6.2.
func (c *client) Sign(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
return c.SignWithFlags(key, data, 0)
}
func (c *client) SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureFlags) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
req := ssh.Marshal(signRequestAgentMsg{
KeyBlob: key.Marshal(),
Data: data,
Flags: uint32(flags),
})
msg, err := c.call(req)
@ -681,3 +746,44 @@ func (s *agentKeyringSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature,
// The agent has its own entropy source, so the rand argument is ignored.
return s.agent.Sign(s.pub, data)
}
func (s *agentKeyringSigner) SignWithOpts(rand io.Reader, data []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
var flags SignatureFlags
if opts != nil {
switch opts.HashFunc() {
case crypto.SHA256:
flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha256
case crypto.SHA512:
flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha512
}
}
return s.agent.SignWithFlags(s.pub, data, flags)
}
// Calls an extension method. It is up to the agent implementation as to whether or not
// any particular extension is supported and may always return an error. Because the
// type of the response is up to the implementation, this returns the bytes of the
// response and does not attempt any type of unmarshalling.
func (c *client) Extension(extensionType string, contents []byte) ([]byte, error) {
req := ssh.Marshal(extensionAgentMsg{
ExtensionType: extensionType,
Contents: contents,
})
buf, err := c.callRaw(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(buf) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("agent: failure; empty response")
}
// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 indicates that an SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message
// represents an agent that does not support the extension
if buf[0] == agentFailure {
return nil, ErrExtensionUnsupported
}
if buf[0] == agentExtensionFailure {
return nil, errors.New("agent: generic extension failure")
}
return buf, nil
}

28
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go generated vendored
View file

@ -182,6 +182,10 @@ func (r *keyring) Add(key AddedKey) error {
// Sign returns a signature for the data.
func (r *keyring) Sign(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
return r.SignWithFlags(key, data, 0)
}
func (r *keyring) SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureFlags) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if r.locked {
@ -192,7 +196,24 @@ func (r *keyring) Sign(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
wanted := key.Marshal()
for _, k := range r.keys {
if bytes.Equal(k.signer.PublicKey().Marshal(), wanted) {
return k.signer.Sign(rand.Reader, data)
if flags == 0 {
return k.signer.Sign(rand.Reader, data)
} else {
if algorithmSigner, ok := k.signer.(ssh.AlgorithmSigner); !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: signature does not support non-default signature algorithm: %T", k.signer)
} else {
var algorithm string
switch flags {
case SignatureFlagRsaSha256:
algorithm = ssh.SigAlgoRSASHA2256
case SignatureFlagRsaSha512:
algorithm = ssh.SigAlgoRSASHA2512
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported signature flags: %d", flags)
}
return algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand.Reader, data, algorithm)
}
}
}
}
return nil, errors.New("not found")
@ -213,3 +234,8 @@ func (r *keyring) Signers() ([]ssh.Signer, error) {
}
return s, nil
}
// The keyring does not support any extensions
func (r *keyring) Extension(extensionType string, contents []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, ErrExtensionUnsupported
}

49
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go generated vendored
View file

@ -128,7 +128,14 @@ func (s *server) processRequest(data []byte) (interface{}, error) {
Blob: req.KeyBlob,
}
sig, err := s.agent.Sign(k, req.Data) // TODO(hanwen): flags.
var sig *ssh.Signature
var err error
if extendedAgent, ok := s.agent.(ExtendedAgent); ok {
sig, err = extendedAgent.SignWithFlags(k, req.Data, SignatureFlags(req.Flags))
} else {
sig, err = s.agent.Sign(k, req.Data)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -150,6 +157,43 @@ func (s *server) processRequest(data []byte) (interface{}, error) {
case agentAddIDConstrained, agentAddIdentity:
return nil, s.insertIdentity(data)
case agentExtension:
// Return a stub object where the whole contents of the response gets marshaled.
var responseStub struct {
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
if extendedAgent, ok := s.agent.(ExtendedAgent); !ok {
// If this agent doesn't implement extensions, [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7
// requires that we return a standard SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message.
responseStub.Rest = []byte{agentFailure}
} else {
var req extensionAgentMsg
if err := ssh.Unmarshal(data, &req); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res, err := extendedAgent.Extension(req.ExtensionType, req.Contents)
if err != nil {
// If agent extensions are unsupported, return a standard SSH_AGENT_FAILURE
// message as required by [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7.
if err == ErrExtensionUnsupported {
responseStub.Rest = []byte{agentFailure}
} else {
// As the result of any other error processing an extension request,
// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 requires that we return a
// SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE code.
responseStub.Rest = []byte{agentExtensionFailure}
}
} else {
if len(res) == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
responseStub.Rest = res
}
}
return responseStub, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown opcode %d", data[0])
@ -497,6 +541,9 @@ func ServeAgent(agent Agent, c io.ReadWriter) error {
return err
}
l := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(length[:])
if l == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("agent: request size is 0")
}
if l > maxAgentResponseBytes {
// We also cap requests.
return fmt.Errorf("agent: request too large: %d", l)

16
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go generated vendored
View file

@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ type openSSHCertSigner struct {
signer Signer
}
type algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner struct {
*openSSHCertSigner
algorithmSigner AlgorithmSigner
}
// NewCertSigner returns a Signer that signs with the given Certificate, whose
// private key is held by signer. It returns an error if the public key in cert
// doesn't match the key used by signer.
@ -230,7 +235,12 @@ func NewCertSigner(cert *Certificate, signer Signer) (Signer, error) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: signer and cert have different public key")
}
return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil
if algorithmSigner, ok := signer.(AlgorithmSigner); ok {
return &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{
&openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, algorithmSigner}, nil
} else {
return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil
}
}
func (s *openSSHCertSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
@ -241,6 +251,10 @@ func (s *openSSHCertSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey {
return s.pub
}
func (s *algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
return s.algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm)
}
const sourceAddressCriticalOption = "source-address"
// CertChecker does the work of verifying a certificate. Its methods

24
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go generated vendored
View file

@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ type streamPacketCipher struct {
macResult []byte
}
// readPacket reads and decrypt a single packet from the reader argument.
func (s *streamPacketCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
// readCipherPacket reads and decrypt a single packet from the reader argument.
func (s *streamPacketCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.prefix[:]); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -221,8 +221,8 @@ func (s *streamPacketCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, err
return s.packetData[:length-paddingLength-1], nil
}
// writePacket encrypts and sends a packet of data to the writer argument
func (s *streamPacketCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
// writeCipherPacket encrypts and sends a packet of data to the writer argument
func (s *streamPacketCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
if len(packet) > maxPacket {
return errors.New("ssh: packet too large")
}
@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms)
const gcmTagSize = 16
func (c *gcmCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
func (c *gcmCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
// Pad out to multiple of 16 bytes. This is different from the
// stream cipher because that encrypts the length too.
padding := byte(packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(packet))%packetSizeMultiple)
@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ func (c *gcmCipher) incIV() {
}
}
func (c *gcmCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
func (c *gcmCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.prefix[:]); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -486,8 +486,8 @@ type cbcError string
func (e cbcError) Error() string { return string(e) }
func (c *cbcCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
p, err := c.readPacketLeaky(seqNum, r)
func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
p, err := c.readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum, r)
if err != nil {
if _, ok := err.(cbcError); ok {
// Verification error: read a fixed amount of
@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ func (c *cbcCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
return p, err
}
func (c *cbcCipher) readPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
blockSize := c.decrypter.BlockSize()
// Read the header, which will include some of the subsequent data in the
@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ func (c *cbcCipher) readPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error)
return c.packetData[prefixLen:paddingStart], nil
}
func (c *cbcCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
func (c *cbcCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
effectiveBlockSize := maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, c.encrypter.BlockSize())
// Length of encrypted portion of the packet (header, payload, padding).
@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionA
return c, nil
}
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
var polyKey [32]byte
@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte,
return plain, nil
}
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error {
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error {
nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
var polyKey [32]byte

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go generated vendored
View file

@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func Dial(network, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (*Client, error) {
// keys. A HostKeyCallback must return nil if the host key is OK, or
// an error to reject it. It receives the hostname as passed to Dial
// or NewClientConn. The remote address is the RemoteAddr of the
// net.Conn underlying the the SSH connection.
// net.Conn underlying the SSH connection.
type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error
// BannerCallback is the function type used for treat the banner sent by

20
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go generated vendored
View file

@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ func findCommon(what string, client []string, server []string) (common string, e
return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common algorithm for %s; client offered: %v, server offered: %v", what, client, server)
}
// directionAlgorithms records algorithm choices in one direction (either read or write)
type directionAlgorithms struct {
Cipher string
MAC string
@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ type algorithms struct {
r directionAlgorithms
}
func findAgreedAlgorithms(clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *algorithms, err error) {
func findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient bool, clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *algorithms, err error) {
result := &algorithms{}
result.kex, err = findCommon("key exchange", clientKexInit.KexAlgos, serverKexInit.KexAlgos)
@ -150,32 +151,37 @@ func findAgreedAlgorithms(clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *algor
return
}
result.w.Cipher, err = findCommon("client to server cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersClientServer, serverKexInit.CiphersClientServer)
stoc, ctos := &result.w, &result.r
if isClient {
ctos, stoc = stoc, ctos
}
ctos.Cipher, err = findCommon("client to server cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersClientServer, serverKexInit.CiphersClientServer)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.r.Cipher, err = findCommon("server to client cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersServerClient, serverKexInit.CiphersServerClient)
stoc.Cipher, err = findCommon("server to client cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersServerClient, serverKexInit.CiphersServerClient)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.w.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer)
ctos.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.r.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient)
stoc.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.w.Compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer)
ctos.Compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.r.Compression, err = findCommon("server to client compression", clientKexInit.CompressionServerClient, serverKexInit.CompressionServerClient)
stoc.Compression, err = findCommon("server to client compression", clientKexInit.CompressionServerClient, serverKexInit.CompressionServerClient)
if err != nil {
return
}

5
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go generated vendored
View file

@ -543,7 +543,8 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
clientInit := otherInit
serverInit := t.sentInitMsg
if len(t.hostKeys) == 0 {
isClient := len(t.hostKeys) == 0
if isClient {
clientInit, serverInit = serverInit, clientInit
magics.clientKexInit = t.sentInitPacket
@ -551,7 +552,7 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
}
var err error
t.algorithms, err = findAgreedAlgorithms(clientInit, serverInit)
t.algorithms, err = findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient, clientInit, serverInit)
if err != nil {
return err
}

89
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go generated vendored
View file

@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ const (
KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519"
)
// These constants represent non-default signature algorithms that are supported
// as algorithm parameters to AlgorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm methods. See
// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.5.1 and
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10
const (
SigAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa"
SigAlgoRSASHA2256 = "rsa-sha2-256"
SigAlgoRSASHA2512 = "rsa-sha2-512"
)
// parsePubKey parses a public key of the given algorithm.
// Use ParsePublicKey for keys with prepended algorithm.
func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
@ -301,6 +311,19 @@ type Signer interface {
Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error)
}
// A AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying a specific
// algorithm to use for signing.
type AlgorithmSigner interface {
Signer
// SignWithAlgorithm is like Signer.Sign, but allows specification of a
// non-default signing algorithm. See the SigAlgo* constants in this
// package for signature algorithms supported by this package. Callers may
// pass an empty string for the algorithm in which case the AlgorithmSigner
// will use its default algorithm.
SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error)
}
type rsaPublicKey rsa.PublicKey
func (r *rsaPublicKey) Type() string {
@ -349,13 +372,21 @@ func (r *rsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
}
func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
if sig.Format != r.Type() {
var hash crypto.Hash
switch sig.Format {
case SigAlgoRSA:
hash = crypto.SHA1
case SigAlgoRSASHA2256:
hash = crypto.SHA256
case SigAlgoRSASHA2512:
hash = crypto.SHA512
default:
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, r.Type())
}
h := crypto.SHA1.New()
h := hash.New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), crypto.SHA1, digest, sig.Blob)
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), hash, digest, sig.Blob)
}
func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey {
@ -459,6 +490,14 @@ func (k *dsaPrivateKey) PublicKey() PublicKey {
}
func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "")
}
func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
if algorithm != "" && algorithm != k.PublicKey().Type() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
}
h := crypto.SHA1.New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
@ -691,16 +730,42 @@ func (s *wrappedSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey {
}
func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "")
}
func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
switch key := s.pubKey.(type) {
case *rsaPublicKey, *dsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA1
case *ecdsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = ecHash(key.Curve)
case ed25519PublicKey:
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key)
if _, ok := s.pubKey.(*rsaPublicKey); ok {
// RSA keys support a few hash functions determined by the requested signature algorithm
switch algorithm {
case "", SigAlgoRSA:
algorithm = SigAlgoRSA
hashFunc = crypto.SHA1
case SigAlgoRSASHA2256:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
case SigAlgoRSASHA2512:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA512
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
}
} else {
// The only supported algorithm for all other key types is the same as the type of the key
if algorithm == "" {
algorithm = s.pubKey.Type()
} else if algorithm != s.pubKey.Type() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
}
switch key := s.pubKey.(type) {
case *dsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA1
case *ecdsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = ecHash(key.Curve)
case ed25519PublicKey:
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key)
}
}
var digest []byte
@ -745,7 +810,7 @@ func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
}
return &Signature{
Format: s.pubKey.Type(),
Format: algorithm,
Blob: signature,
}, nil
}

4
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts/knownhosts.go generated vendored
View file

@ -350,8 +350,8 @@ func (db *hostKeyDB) check(address string, remote net.Addr, remoteKey ssh.Public
return db.checkAddr(hostToCheck, remoteKey)
}
// checkAddrs checks if we can find the given public key for any of
// the given addresses. If we only find an entry for the IP address,
// checkAddr checks if we can find the given public key for the
// given address. If we only find an entry for the IP address,
// or only the hostname, then this still succeeds.
func (db *hostKeyDB) checkAddr(a addr, remoteKey ssh.PublicKey) error {
// TODO(hanwen): are these the right semantics? What if there

26
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go generated vendored
View file

@ -764,3 +764,29 @@ func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) {
}
return msg, nil
}
var packetTypeNames = map[byte]string{
msgDisconnect: "disconnectMsg",
msgServiceRequest: "serviceRequestMsg",
msgServiceAccept: "serviceAcceptMsg",
msgKexInit: "kexInitMsg",
msgKexDHInit: "kexDHInitMsg",
msgKexDHReply: "kexDHReplyMsg",
msgUserAuthRequest: "userAuthRequestMsg",
msgUserAuthSuccess: "userAuthSuccessMsg",
msgUserAuthFailure: "userAuthFailureMsg",
msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: "userAuthPubKeyOkMsg",
msgGlobalRequest: "globalRequestMsg",
msgRequestSuccess: "globalRequestSuccessMsg",
msgRequestFailure: "globalRequestFailureMsg",
msgChannelOpen: "channelOpenMsg",
msgChannelData: "channelDataMsg",
msgChannelOpenConfirm: "channelOpenConfirmMsg",
msgChannelOpenFailure: "channelOpenFailureMsg",
msgChannelWindowAdjust: "windowAdjustMsg",
msgChannelEOF: "channelEOFMsg",
msgChannelClose: "channelCloseMsg",
msgChannelRequest: "channelRequestMsg",
msgChannelSuccess: "channelRequestSuccessMsg",
msgChannelFailure: "channelRequestFailureMsg",
}

3
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go generated vendored
View file

@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password)
case "keyboard-interactive":
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configubred")
authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured")
break
}
@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
// sig.Format. This is usually the same, but
// for certs, the names differ.
if !isAcceptableAlgo(sig.Format) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format)
break
}
signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algoBytes, pubKeyData)

12
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go generated vendored
View file

@ -53,14 +53,14 @@ type transport struct {
// packetCipher represents a combination of SSH encryption/MAC
// protocol. A single instance should be used for one direction only.
type packetCipher interface {
// writePacket encrypts the packet and writes it to w. The
// writeCipherPacket encrypts the packet and writes it to w. The
// contents of the packet are generally scrambled.
writePacket(seqnum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error
writeCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error
// readPacket reads and decrypts a packet of data. The
// readCipherPacket reads and decrypts a packet of data. The
// returned packet may be overwritten by future calls of
// readPacket.
readPacket(seqnum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error)
readCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error)
}
// connectionState represents one side (read or write) of the
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) {
}
func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
packet, err := s.packetCipher.readPacket(s.seqNum, r)
packet, err := s.packetCipher.readCipherPacket(s.seqNum, r)
s.seqNum++
if err == nil && len(packet) == 0 {
err = errors.New("ssh: zero length packet")
@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
changeKeys := len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgNewKeys
err := s.packetCipher.writePacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet)
err := s.packetCipher.writeCipherPacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet)
if err != nil {
return err
}