Switch to keybase go-crypto (for some elliptic curve key) + test (#1925)

* Switch to keybase go-crypto (for some elliptic curve key) + test

* Use assert.NoError 

and add a little more context to failing test description

* Use assert.(No)Error everywhere 🌈

and assert.Error in place of .Nil/.NotNil

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go

@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+// This file implements encryption and decryption using PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.
+
+// PKCS1v15DecrypterOpts is for passing options to PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption using
+// the crypto.Decrypter interface.
+type PKCS1v15DecryptOptions struct {
+	// SessionKeyLen is the length of the session key that is being
+	// decrypted. If not zero, then a padding error during decryption will
+	// cause a random plaintext of this length to be returned rather than
+	// an error. These alternatives happen in constant time.
+	SessionKeyLen int
+}
+
+// EncryptPKCS1v15 encrypts the given message with RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
+// The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus minus 11 bytes.
+//
+// The rand parameter is used as a source of entropy to ensure that encrypting
+// the same message twice doesn't result in the same ciphertext.
+//
+// WARNING: use of this function to encrypt plaintexts other than session keys
+// is dangerous. Use RSA OAEP in new protocols.
+func EncryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(pub); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if len(msg) > k-11 {
+		err = ErrMessageTooLong
+		return
+	}
+
+	// EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M
+	em := make([]byte, k)
+	em[1] = 2
+	ps, mm := em[2:len(em)-len(msg)-1], em[len(em)-len(msg):]
+	err = nonZeroRandomBytes(ps, rand)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	em[len(em)-len(msg)-1] = 0
+	copy(mm, msg)
+
+	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)
+
+	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
+	out = em
+	return
+}
+
+// DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
+// If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
+//
+// Note that whether this function returns an error or not discloses secret
+// information. If an attacker can cause this function to run repeatedly and
+// learn whether each instance returned an error then they can decrypt and
+// forge signatures as if they had the private key. See
+// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey for a way of solving this problem.
+func DecryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	valid, out, index, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if valid == 0 {
+		return nil, ErrDecryption
+	}
+	out = out[index:]
+	return
+}
+
+// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey decrypts a session key using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
+// If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
+// It returns an error if the ciphertext is the wrong length or if the
+// ciphertext is greater than the public modulus. Otherwise, no error is
+// returned. If the padding is valid, the resulting plaintext message is copied
+// into key. Otherwise, key is unchanged. These alternatives occur in constant
+// time. It is intended that the user of this function generate a random
+// session key beforehand and continue the protocol with the resulting value.
+// This will remove any possibility that an attacker can learn any information
+// about the plaintext.
+// See ``Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+// Encryption Standard PKCS #1'', Daniel Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology
+// (Crypto '98).
+//
+// Note that if the session key is too small then it may be possible for an
+// attacker to brute-force it. If they can do that then they can learn whether
+// a random value was used (because it'll be different for the same ciphertext)
+// and thus whether the padding was correct. This defeats the point of this
+// function. Using at least a 16-byte key will protect against this attack.
+func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, key []byte) (err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if k-(len(key)+3+8) < 0 {
+		return ErrDecryption
+	}
+
+	valid, em, index, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if len(em) != k {
+		// This should be impossible because decryptPKCS1v15 always
+		// returns the full slice.
+		return ErrDecryption
+	}
+
+	valid &= subtle.ConstantTimeEq(int32(len(em)-index), int32(len(key)))
+	subtle.ConstantTimeCopy(valid, key, em[len(em)-len(key):])
+	return
+}
+
+// decryptPKCS1v15 decrypts ciphertext using priv and blinds the operation if
+// rand is not nil. It returns one or zero in valid that indicates whether the
+// plaintext was correctly structured. In either case, the plaintext is
+// returned in em so that it may be read independently of whether it was valid
+// in order to maintain constant memory access patterns. If the plaintext was
+// valid then index contains the index of the original message in em.
+func decryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (valid int, em []byte, index int, err error) {
+	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if k < 11 {
+		err = ErrDecryption
+		return
+	}
+
+	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(ciphertext)
+	m, err := decrypt(rand, priv, c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	em = leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
+	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+	secondByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 2)
+
+	// The remainder of the plaintext must be a string of non-zero random
+	// octets, followed by a 0, followed by the message.
+	//   lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the zero.
+	//   index: the offset of the first zero byte.
+	lookingForIndex := 1
+
+	for i := 2; i < len(em); i++ {
+		equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0)
+		index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals0, i, index)
+		lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals0, 0, lookingForIndex)
+	}
+
+	// The PS padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two
+	// bytes into em.
+	validPS := subtle.ConstantTimeLessOrEq(2+8, index)
+
+	valid = firstByteIsZero & secondByteIsTwo & (^lookingForIndex & 1) & validPS
+	index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(valid, index+1, 0)
+	return valid, em, index, nil
+}
+
+// nonZeroRandomBytes fills the given slice with non-zero random octets.
+func nonZeroRandomBytes(s []byte, rand io.Reader) (err error) {
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
+		for s[i] == 0 {
+			_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s[i:i+1])
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			// In tests, the PRNG may return all zeros so we do
+			// this to break the loop.
+			s[i] ^= 0x42
+		}
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// These are ASN1 DER structures:
+//   DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+//     digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+//     digest OCTET STRING
+//   }
+// For performance, we don't use the generic ASN1 encoder. Rather, we
+// precompute a prefix of the digest value that makes a valid ASN1 DER string
+// with the correct contents.
+var hashPrefixes = map[crypto.Hash][]byte{
+	crypto.MD5:       {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
+	crypto.SHA1:      {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
+	crypto.SHA224:    {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
+	crypto.SHA256:    {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
+	crypto.SHA384:    {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
+	crypto.SHA512:    {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
+	crypto.MD5SHA1:   {}, // A special TLS case which doesn't use an ASN1 prefix.
+	crypto.RIPEMD160: {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x28, 0xcf, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x31, 0x04, 0x14},
+}
+
+// SignPKCS1v15 calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN from RSA PKCS#1 v1.5.
+// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+// given hash function. If hash is zero, hashed is signed directly. This isn't
+// advisable except for interoperability.
+//
+// If rand is not nil then RSA blinding will be used to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
+//
+// This function is deterministic. Thus, if the set of possible messages is
+// small, an attacker may be able to build a map from messages to signatures
+// and identify the signed messages. As ever, signatures provide authenticity,
+// not confidentiality.
+func SignPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
+	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
+	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if k < tLen+11 {
+		return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
+	}
+
+	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
+	em := make([]byte, k)
+	em[1] = 1
+	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
+		em[i] = 0xff
+	}
+	copy(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
+	copy(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
+
+	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+	c, err := decryptAndCheck(rand, priv, m)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
+	s = em
+	return
+}
+
+// VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
+// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
+// returning a nil error. If hash is zero then hashed is used directly. This
+// isn't advisable except for interoperability.
+func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte) (err error) {
+	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
+	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if k < tLen+11 {
+		err = ErrVerification
+		return
+	}
+
+	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
+	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, c)
+	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
+	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
+
+	ok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 1)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[k-tLen-1], 0)
+
+	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
+		ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0xff)
+	}
+
+	if ok != 1 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash crypto.Hash, inLen int) (hashLen int, prefix []byte, err error) {
+	// Special case: crypto.Hash(0) is used to indicate that the data is
+	// signed directly.
+	if hash == 0 {
+		return inLen, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	hashLen = hash.Size()
+	if inLen != hashLen {
+		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
+	}
+	prefix, ok := hashPrefixes[hash]
+	if !ok {
+		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: unsupported hash function")
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// copyWithLeftPad copies src to the end of dest, padding with zero bytes as
+// needed.
+func copyWithLeftPad(dest, src []byte) {
+	numPaddingBytes := len(dest) - len(src)
+	for i := 0; i < numPaddingBytes; i++ {
+		dest[i] = 0
+	}
+	copy(dest[numPaddingBytes:], src)
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa/pss.go

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa
+
+// This file implements the PSS signature scheme [1].
+//
+// [1] http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pkcs/files/h11300-wp-pkcs-1v2-2-rsa-cryptography-standard.pdf
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+	// See [1], section 9.1.1
+	hLen := hash.Size()
+	sLen := len(salt)
+	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+
+	// 1.  If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+	//     hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "message too
+	//     long" and stop.
+	//
+	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+
+	if len(mHash) != hLen {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
+	}
+
+	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop.
+
+	if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: encoding error")
+	}
+
+	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+	db := em[:emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen]
+	h := em[emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen : emLen-1]
+
+	// 4.  Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen = 0,
+	//     then salt is the empty string.
+	//
+	// 5.  Let
+	//       M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt;
+	//
+	//     M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
+	//     initial zero octets.
+	//
+	// 6.  Let H = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.
+
+	var prefix [8]byte
+
+	hash.Write(prefix[:])
+	hash.Write(mHash)
+	hash.Write(salt)
+
+	h = hash.Sum(h[:0])
+	hash.Reset()
+
+	// 7.  Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - sLen - hLen - 2
+	//     zero octets.  The length of PS may be 0.
+	//
+	// 8.  Let DB = PS || 0x01 || salt; DB is an octet string of length
+	//     emLen - hLen - 1.
+
+	db[emLen-sLen-hLen-2] = 0x01
+	copy(db[emLen-sLen-hLen-1:], salt)
+
+	// 9.  Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+	//
+	// 10. Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask.
+
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, h)
+
+	// 11. Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+	//     maskedDB to zero.
+
+	db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
+
+	// 12. Let EM = maskedDB || H || 0xbc.
+	em[emLen-1] = 0xBC
+
+	// 13. Output EM.
+	return em, nil
+}
+
+func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+	// 1.  If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+	//     hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "inconsistent"
+	//     and stop.
+	//
+	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+	hLen := hash.Size()
+	if hLen != len(mHash) {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+	if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 4.  If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
+	//     0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+	if em[len(em)-1] != 0xBC {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 5.  Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen - hLen - 1 octets of EM, and
+	//     let H be the next hLen octets.
+	db := em[:emLen-hLen-1]
+	h := em[emLen-hLen-1 : len(em)-1]
+
+	// 6.  If the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+	//     maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and
+	//     stop.
+	if em[0]&(0xFF<<uint(8-(8*emLen-emBits))) != 0 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 7.  Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+	//
+	// 8.  Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask.
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, h)
+
+	// 9.  Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in DB
+	//     to zero.
+	db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
+
+	if sLen == PSSSaltLengthAuto {
+	FindSaltLength:
+		for sLen = emLen - (hLen + 2); sLen >= 0; sLen-- {
+			switch db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+			case 1:
+				break FindSaltLength
+			case 0:
+				continue
+			default:
+				return ErrVerification
+			}
+		}
+		if sLen < 0 {
+			return ErrVerification
+		}
+	} else {
+		// 10. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
+		//     or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
+		//     position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
+		//     output "inconsistent" and stop.
+		for _, e := range db[:emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+			if e != 0x00 {
+				return ErrVerification
+			}
+		}
+		if db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] != 0x01 {
+			return ErrVerification
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 11.  Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB.
+	salt := db[len(db)-sLen:]
+
+	// 12.  Let
+	//          M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt ;
+	//     M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
+	//     initial zero octets.
+	//
+	// 13. Let H' = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.
+	var prefix [8]byte
+	hash.Write(prefix[:])
+	hash.Write(mHash)
+	hash.Write(salt)
+
+	h0 := hash.Sum(nil)
+
+	// 14. If H = H', output "consistent." Otherwise, output "inconsistent."
+	if !bytes.Equal(h0, h) {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// signPSSWithSalt calculates the signature of hashed using PSS [1] with specified salt.
+// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+// given hash function. salt is a random sequence of bytes whose length will be
+// later used to verify the signature.
+func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
+	nBits := priv.N.BitLen()
+	em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, nBits-1, salt, hash.New())
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+	c, err := decryptAndCheck(rand, priv, m)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	s = make([]byte, (nBits+7)/8)
+	copyWithLeftPad(s, c.Bytes())
+	return
+}
+
+const (
+	// PSSSaltLengthAuto causes the salt in a PSS signature to be as large
+	// as possible when signing, and to be auto-detected when verifying.
+	PSSSaltLengthAuto = 0
+	// PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash causes the salt length to equal the length
+	// of the hash used in the signature.
+	PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash = -1
+)
+
+// PSSOptions contains options for creating and verifying PSS signatures.
+type PSSOptions struct {
+	// SaltLength controls the length of the salt used in the PSS
+	// signature. It can either be a number of bytes, or one of the special
+	// PSSSaltLength constants.
+	SaltLength int
+
+	// Hash, if not zero, overrides the hash function passed to SignPSS.
+	// This is the only way to specify the hash function when using the
+	// crypto.Signer interface.
+	Hash crypto.Hash
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns pssOpts.Hash so that PSSOptions implements
+// crypto.SignerOpts.
+func (pssOpts *PSSOptions) HashFunc() crypto.Hash {
+	return pssOpts.Hash
+}
+
+func (opts *PSSOptions) saltLength() int {
+	if opts == nil {
+		return PSSSaltLengthAuto
+	}
+	return opts.SaltLength
+}
+
+// SignPSS calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PSS [1].
+// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+// given hash function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+// defaults are used.
+func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, opts *PSSOptions) (s []byte, err error) {
+	saltLength := opts.saltLength()
+	switch saltLength {
+	case PSSSaltLengthAuto:
+		saltLength = (priv.N.BitLen()+7)/8 - 2 - hash.Size()
+	case PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash:
+		saltLength = hash.Size()
+	}
+
+	if opts != nil && opts.Hash != 0 {
+		hash = opts.Hash
+	}
+
+	salt := make([]byte, saltLength)
+	if _, err = io.ReadFull(rand, salt); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	return signPSSWithSalt(rand, priv, hash, hashed, salt)
+}
+
+// VerifyPSS verifies a PSS signature.
+// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
+// returning a nil error. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+// defaults are used.
+func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, opts *PSSOptions) error {
+	return verifyPSS(pub, hash, hashed, sig, opts.saltLength())
+}
+
+// verifyPSS verifies a PSS signature with the given salt length.
+func verifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, saltLen int) error {
+	nBits := pub.N.BitLen()
+	if len(sig) != (nBits+7)/8 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
+	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, s)
+	emBits := nBits - 1
+	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+	if emLen < len(m.Bytes()) {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+	copyWithLeftPad(em, m.Bytes())
+	if saltLen == PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash {
+		saltLen = hash.Size()
+	}
+	return emsaPSSVerify(hashed, em, emBits, saltLen, hash.New())
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa/rsa.go

@@ -0,0 +1,646 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package rsa implements RSA encryption as specified in PKCS#1.
+//
+// RSA is a single, fundamental operation that is used in this package to
+// implement either public-key encryption or public-key signatures.
+//
+// The original specification for encryption and signatures with RSA is PKCS#1
+// and the terms "RSA encryption" and "RSA signatures" by default refer to
+// PKCS#1 version 1.5. However, that specification has flaws and new designs
+// should use version two, usually called by just OAEP and PSS, where
+// possible.
+//
+// Two sets of interfaces are included in this package. When a more abstract
+// interface isn't neccessary, there are functions for encrypting/decrypting
+// with v1.5/OAEP and signing/verifying with v1.5/PSS. If one needs to abstract
+// over the public-key primitive, the PrivateKey struct implements the
+// Decrypter and Signer interfaces from the crypto package.
+package rsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+var bigZero = big.NewInt(0)
+var bigOne = big.NewInt(1)
+
+// A PublicKey represents the public part of an RSA key.
+type PublicKey struct {
+	N *big.Int // modulus
+	E int64    // public exponent
+}
+
+// OAEPOptions is an interface for passing options to OAEP decryption using the
+// crypto.Decrypter interface.
+type OAEPOptions struct {
+	// Hash is the hash function that will be used when generating the mask.
+	Hash crypto.Hash
+	// Label is an arbitrary byte string that must be equal to the value
+	// used when encrypting.
+	Label []byte
+}
+
+var (
+	errPublicModulus       = errors.New("crypto/rsa: missing public modulus")
+	errPublicExponentSmall = errors.New("crypto/rsa: public exponent too small")
+	errPublicExponentLarge = errors.New("crypto/rsa: public exponent too large")
+)
+
+// checkPub sanity checks the public key before we use it.
+// We require pub.E to fit into a 32-bit integer so that we
+// do not have different behavior depending on whether
+// int is 32 or 64 bits. See also
+// http://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/16/rsae.html.
+func checkPub(pub *PublicKey) error {
+	if pub.N == nil {
+		return errPublicModulus
+	}
+	if pub.E < 2 {
+		return errPublicExponentSmall
+	}
+	if pub.E > 1<<63-1 {
+		return errPublicExponentLarge
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// A PrivateKey represents an RSA key
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey            // public part.
+	D         *big.Int   // private exponent
+	Primes    []*big.Int // prime factors of N, has >= 2 elements.
+
+	// Precomputed contains precomputed values that speed up private
+	// operations, if available.
+	Precomputed PrecomputedValues
+}
+
+// Public returns the public key corresponding to priv.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
+	return &priv.PublicKey
+}
+
+// Sign signs msg with priv, reading randomness from rand. If opts is a
+// *PSSOptions then the PSS algorithm will be used, otherwise PKCS#1 v1.5 will
+// be used. This method is intended to support keys where the private part is
+// kept in, for example, a hardware module. Common uses should use the Sign*
+// functions in this package.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, msg []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error) {
+	if pssOpts, ok := opts.(*PSSOptions); ok {
+		return SignPSS(rand, priv, pssOpts.Hash, msg, pssOpts)
+	}
+
+	return SignPKCS1v15(rand, priv, opts.HashFunc(), msg)
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts ciphertext with priv. If opts is nil or of type
+// *PKCS1v15DecryptOptions then PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption is performed. Otherwise
+// opts must have type *OAEPOptions and OAEP decryption is done.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(rand io.Reader, ciphertext []byte, opts crypto.DecrypterOpts) (plaintext []byte, err error) {
+	if opts == nil {
+		return DecryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+	}
+
+	switch opts := opts.(type) {
+	case *OAEPOptions:
+		return DecryptOAEP(opts.Hash.New(), rand, priv, ciphertext, opts.Label)
+
+	case *PKCS1v15DecryptOptions:
+		if l := opts.SessionKeyLen; l > 0 {
+			plaintext = make([]byte, l)
+			if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, plaintext); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			if err := DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(rand, priv, ciphertext, plaintext); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			return plaintext, nil
+		} else {
+			return DecryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+		}
+
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid options for Decrypt")
+	}
+}
+
+type PrecomputedValues struct {
+	Dp, Dq *big.Int // D mod (P-1) (or mod Q-1)
+	Qinv   *big.Int // Q^-1 mod P
+
+	// CRTValues is used for the 3rd and subsequent primes. Due to a
+	// historical accident, the CRT for the first two primes is handled
+	// differently in PKCS#1 and interoperability is sufficiently
+	// important that we mirror this.
+	CRTValues []CRTValue
+}
+
+// CRTValue contains the precomputed Chinese remainder theorem values.
+type CRTValue struct {
+	Exp   *big.Int // D mod (prime-1).
+	Coeff *big.Int // R·Coeff ≡ 1 mod Prime.
+	R     *big.Int // product of primes prior to this (inc p and q).
+}
+
+// Validate performs basic sanity checks on the key.
+// It returns nil if the key is valid, or else an error describing a problem.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Validate() error {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Check that Πprimes == n.
+	modulus := new(big.Int).Set(bigOne)
+	for _, prime := range priv.Primes {
+		// Any primes ≤ 1 will cause divide-by-zero panics later.
+		if prime.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 {
+			return errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid prime value")
+		}
+		modulus.Mul(modulus, prime)
+	}
+	if modulus.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {
+		return errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid modulus")
+	}
+
+	// Check that de ≡ 1 mod p-1, for each prime.
+	// This implies that e is coprime to each p-1 as e has a multiplicative
+	// inverse. Therefore e is coprime to lcm(p-1,q-1,r-1,...) =
+	// exponent(ℤ/nℤ). It also implies that a^de ≡ a mod p as a^(p-1) ≡ 1
+	// mod p. Thus a^de ≡ a mod n for all a coprime to n, as required.
+	congruence := new(big.Int)
+	de := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(priv.E))
+	de.Mul(de, priv.D)
+	for _, prime := range priv.Primes {
+		pminus1 := new(big.Int).Sub(prime, bigOne)
+		congruence.Mod(de, pminus1)
+		if congruence.Cmp(bigOne) != 0 {
+			return errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid exponents")
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GenerateKey generates an RSA keypair of the given bit size using the
+// random source random (for example, crypto/rand.Reader).
+func GenerateKey(random io.Reader, bits int) (priv *PrivateKey, err error) {
+	return GenerateMultiPrimeKey(random, 2, bits)
+}
+
+// GenerateMultiPrimeKey generates a multi-prime RSA keypair of the given bit
+// size and the given random source, as suggested in [1]. Although the public
+// keys are compatible (actually, indistinguishable) from the 2-prime case,
+// the private keys are not. Thus it may not be possible to export multi-prime
+// private keys in certain formats or to subsequently import them into other
+// code.
+//
+// Table 1 in [2] suggests maximum numbers of primes for a given size.
+//
+// [1] US patent 4405829 (1972, expired)
+// [2] http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2006/cacr2006-16.pdf
+func GenerateMultiPrimeKey(random io.Reader, nprimes int, bits int) (priv *PrivateKey, err error) {
+	priv = new(PrivateKey)
+	priv.E = 65537
+
+	if nprimes < 2 {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: GenerateMultiPrimeKey: nprimes must be >= 2")
+	}
+
+	primes := make([]*big.Int, nprimes)
+
+NextSetOfPrimes:
+	for {
+		todo := bits
+		// crypto/rand should set the top two bits in each prime.
+		// Thus each prime has the form
+		//   p_i = 2^bitlen(p_i) × 0.11... (in base 2).
+		// And the product is:
+		//   P = 2^todo × α
+		// where α is the product of nprimes numbers of the form 0.11...
+		//
+		// If α < 1/2 (which can happen for nprimes > 2), we need to
+		// shift todo to compensate for lost bits: the mean value of 0.11...
+		// is 7/8, so todo + shift - nprimes * log2(7/8) ~= bits - 1/2
+		// will give good results.
+		if nprimes >= 7 {
+			todo += (nprimes - 2) / 5
+		}
+		for i := 0; i < nprimes; i++ {
+			primes[i], err = rand.Prime(random, todo/(nprimes-i))
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			todo -= primes[i].BitLen()
+		}
+
+		// Make sure that primes is pairwise unequal.
+		for i, prime := range primes {
+			for j := 0; j < i; j++ {
+				if prime.Cmp(primes[j]) == 0 {
+					continue NextSetOfPrimes
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		n := new(big.Int).Set(bigOne)
+		totient := new(big.Int).Set(bigOne)
+		pminus1 := new(big.Int)
+		for _, prime := range primes {
+			n.Mul(n, prime)
+			pminus1.Sub(prime, bigOne)
+			totient.Mul(totient, pminus1)
+		}
+		if n.BitLen() != bits {
+			// This should never happen for nprimes == 2 because
+			// crypto/rand should set the top two bits in each prime.
+			// For nprimes > 2 we hope it does not happen often.
+			continue NextSetOfPrimes
+		}
+
+		g := new(big.Int)
+		priv.D = new(big.Int)
+		y := new(big.Int)
+		e := big.NewInt(int64(priv.E))
+		g.GCD(priv.D, y, e, totient)
+
+		if g.Cmp(bigOne) == 0 {
+			if priv.D.Sign() < 0 {
+				priv.D.Add(priv.D, totient)
+			}
+			priv.Primes = primes
+			priv.N = n
+
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	priv.Precompute()
+	return
+}
+
+// incCounter increments a four byte, big-endian counter.
+func incCounter(c *[4]byte) {
+	if c[3]++; c[3] != 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if c[2]++; c[2] != 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if c[1]++; c[1] != 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	c[0]++
+}
+
+// mgf1XOR XORs the bytes in out with a mask generated using the MGF1 function
+// specified in PKCS#1 v2.1.
+func mgf1XOR(out []byte, hash hash.Hash, seed []byte) {
+	var counter [4]byte
+	var digest []byte
+
+	done := 0
+	for done < len(out) {
+		hash.Write(seed)
+		hash.Write(counter[0:4])
+		digest = hash.Sum(digest[:0])
+		hash.Reset()
+
+		for i := 0; i < len(digest) && done < len(out); i++ {
+			out[done] ^= digest[i]
+			done++
+		}
+		incCounter(&counter)
+	}
+}
+
+// ErrMessageTooLong is returned when attempting to encrypt a message which is
+// too large for the size of the public key.
+var ErrMessageTooLong = errors.New("crypto/rsa: message too long for RSA public key size")
+
+func encrypt(c *big.Int, pub *PublicKey, m *big.Int) *big.Int {
+	e := big.NewInt(int64(pub.E))
+	c.Exp(m, e, pub.N)
+	return c
+}
+
+// EncryptOAEP encrypts the given message with RSA-OAEP.
+//
+// OAEP is parameterised by a hash function that is used as a random oracle.
+// Encryption and decryption of a given message must use the same hash function
+// and sha256.New() is a reasonable choice.
+//
+// The random parameter is used as a source of entropy to ensure that
+// encrypting the same message twice doesn't result in the same ciphertext.
+//
+// The label parameter may contain arbitrary data that will not be encrypted,
+// but which gives important context to the message. For example, if a given
+// public key is used to decrypt two types of messages then distinct label
+// values could be used to ensure that a ciphertext for one purpose cannot be
+// used for another by an attacker. If not required it can be empty.
+//
+// The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus less
+// twice the hash length plus 2.
+func EncryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte, label []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(pub); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	hash.Reset()
+	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if len(msg) > k-2*hash.Size()-2 {
+		err = ErrMessageTooLong
+		return
+	}
+
+	hash.Write(label)
+	lHash := hash.Sum(nil)
+	hash.Reset()
+
+	em := make([]byte, k)
+	seed := em[1 : 1+hash.Size()]
+	db := em[1+hash.Size():]
+
+	copy(db[0:hash.Size()], lHash)
+	db[len(db)-len(msg)-1] = 1
+	copy(db[len(db)-len(msg):], msg)
+
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(random, seed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, seed)
+	mgf1XOR(seed, hash, db)
+
+	m := new(big.Int)
+	m.SetBytes(em)
+	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)
+	out = c.Bytes()
+
+	if len(out) < k {
+		// If the output is too small, we need to left-pad with zeros.
+		t := make([]byte, k)
+		copy(t[k-len(out):], out)
+		out = t
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// ErrDecryption represents a failure to decrypt a message.
+// It is deliberately vague to avoid adaptive attacks.
+var ErrDecryption = errors.New("crypto/rsa: decryption error")
+
+// ErrVerification represents a failure to verify a signature.
+// It is deliberately vague to avoid adaptive attacks.
+var ErrVerification = errors.New("crypto/rsa: verification error")
+
+// modInverse returns ia, the inverse of a in the multiplicative group of prime
+// order n. It requires that a be a member of the group (i.e. less than n).
+func modInverse(a, n *big.Int) (ia *big.Int, ok bool) {
+	g := new(big.Int)
+	x := new(big.Int)
+	y := new(big.Int)
+	g.GCD(x, y, a, n)
+	if g.Cmp(bigOne) != 0 {
+		// In this case, a and n aren't coprime and we cannot calculate
+		// the inverse. This happens because the values of n are nearly
+		// prime (being the product of two primes) rather than truly
+		// prime.
+		return
+	}
+
+	if x.Cmp(bigOne) < 0 {
+		// 0 is not the multiplicative inverse of any element so, if x
+		// < 1, then x is negative.
+		x.Add(x, n)
+	}
+
+	return x, true
+}
+
+// Precompute performs some calculations that speed up private key operations
+// in the future.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Precompute() {
+	if priv.Precomputed.Dp != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	priv.Precomputed.Dp = new(big.Int).Sub(priv.Primes[0], bigOne)
+	priv.Precomputed.Dp.Mod(priv.D, priv.Precomputed.Dp)
+
+	priv.Precomputed.Dq = new(big.Int).Sub(priv.Primes[1], bigOne)
+	priv.Precomputed.Dq.Mod(priv.D, priv.Precomputed.Dq)
+
+	priv.Precomputed.Qinv = new(big.Int).ModInverse(priv.Primes[1], priv.Primes[0])
+
+	r := new(big.Int).Mul(priv.Primes[0], priv.Primes[1])
+	priv.Precomputed.CRTValues = make([]CRTValue, len(priv.Primes)-2)
+	for i := 2; i < len(priv.Primes); i++ {
+		prime := priv.Primes[i]
+		values := &priv.Precomputed.CRTValues[i-2]
+
+		values.Exp = new(big.Int).Sub(prime, bigOne)
+		values.Exp.Mod(priv.D, values.Exp)
+
+		values.R = new(big.Int).Set(r)
+		values.Coeff = new(big.Int).ModInverse(r, prime)
+
+		r.Mul(r, prime)
+	}
+}
+
+// decrypt performs an RSA decryption, resulting in a plaintext integer. If a
+// random source is given, RSA blinding is used.
+func decrypt(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, c *big.Int) (m *big.Int, err error) {
+	// TODO(agl): can we get away with reusing blinds?
+	if c.Cmp(priv.N) > 0 {
+		err = ErrDecryption
+		return
+	}
+
+	var ir *big.Int
+	if random != nil {
+		// Blinding enabled. Blinding involves multiplying c by r^e.
+		// Then the decryption operation performs (m^e * r^e)^d mod n
+		// which equals mr mod n. The factor of r can then be removed
+		// by multiplying by the multiplicative inverse of r.
+
+		var r *big.Int
+
+		for {
+			r, err = rand.Int(random, priv.N)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if r.Cmp(bigZero) == 0 {
+				r = bigOne
+			}
+			var ok bool
+			ir, ok = modInverse(r, priv.N)
+			if ok {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		bigE := big.NewInt(int64(priv.E))
+		rpowe := new(big.Int).Exp(r, bigE, priv.N)
+		cCopy := new(big.Int).Set(c)
+		cCopy.Mul(cCopy, rpowe)
+		cCopy.Mod(cCopy, priv.N)
+		c = cCopy
+	}
+
+	if priv.Precomputed.Dp == nil {
+		m = new(big.Int).Exp(c, priv.D, priv.N)
+	} else {
+		// We have the precalculated values needed for the CRT.
+		m = new(big.Int).Exp(c, priv.Precomputed.Dp, priv.Primes[0])
+		m2 := new(big.Int).Exp(c, priv.Precomputed.Dq, priv.Primes[1])
+		m.Sub(m, m2)
+		if m.Sign() < 0 {
+			m.Add(m, priv.Primes[0])
+		}
+		m.Mul(m, priv.Precomputed.Qinv)
+		m.Mod(m, priv.Primes[0])
+		m.Mul(m, priv.Primes[1])
+		m.Add(m, m2)
+
+		for i, values := range priv.Precomputed.CRTValues {
+			prime := priv.Primes[2+i]
+			m2.Exp(c, values.Exp, prime)
+			m2.Sub(m2, m)
+			m2.Mul(m2, values.Coeff)
+			m2.Mod(m2, prime)
+			if m2.Sign() < 0 {
+				m2.Add(m2, prime)
+			}
+			m2.Mul(m2, values.R)
+			m.Add(m, m2)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ir != nil {
+		// Unblind.
+		m.Mul(m, ir)
+		m.Mod(m, priv.N)
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func decryptAndCheck(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, c *big.Int) (m *big.Int, err error) {
+	m, err = decrypt(random, priv, c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// In order to defend against errors in the CRT computation, m^e is
+	// calculated, which should match the original ciphertext.
+	check := encrypt(new(big.Int), &priv.PublicKey, m)
+	if c.Cmp(check) != 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("rsa: internal error")
+	}
+	return m, nil
+}
+
+// DecryptOAEP decrypts ciphertext using RSA-OAEP.
+
+// OAEP is parameterised by a hash function that is used as a random oracle.
+// Encryption and decryption of a given message must use the same hash function
+// and sha256.New() is a reasonable choice.
+//
+// The random parameter, if not nil, is used to blind the private-key operation
+// and avoid timing side-channel attacks. Blinding is purely internal to this
+// function – the random data need not match that used when encrypting.
+//
+// The label parameter must match the value given when encrypting. See
+// EncryptOAEP for details.
+func DecryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, label []byte) (msg []byte, err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if len(ciphertext) > k ||
+		k < hash.Size()*2+2 {
+		err = ErrDecryption
+		return
+	}
+
+	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(ciphertext)
+
+	m, err := decrypt(random, priv, c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	hash.Write(label)
+	lHash := hash.Sum(nil)
+	hash.Reset()
+
+	// Converting the plaintext number to bytes will strip any
+	// leading zeros so we may have to left pad. We do this unconditionally
+	// to avoid leaking timing information. (Although we still probably
+	// leak the number of leading zeros. It's not clear that we can do
+	// anything about this.)
+	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
+
+	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+
+	seed := em[1 : hash.Size()+1]
+	db := em[hash.Size()+1:]
+
+	mgf1XOR(seed, hash, db)
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, seed)
+
+	lHash2 := db[0:hash.Size()]
+
+	// We have to validate the plaintext in constant time in order to avoid
+	// attacks like: J. Manger. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
+	// Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1
+	// v2.0. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology.
+	lHash2Good := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(lHash, lHash2)
+
+	// The remainder of the plaintext must be zero or more 0x00, followed
+	// by 0x01, followed by the message.
+	//   lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the 0x01
+	//   index: the offset of the first 0x01 byte
+	//   invalid: 1 iff we saw a non-zero byte before the 0x01.
+	var lookingForIndex, index, invalid int
+	lookingForIndex = 1
+	rest := db[hash.Size():]
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(rest); i++ {
+		equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(rest[i], 0)
+		equals1 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(rest[i], 1)
+		index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals1, i, index)
+		lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals1, 0, lookingForIndex)
+		invalid = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&^equals0, 1, invalid)
+	}
+
+	if firstByteIsZero&lHash2Good&^invalid&^lookingForIndex != 1 {
+		err = ErrDecryption
+		return
+	}
+
+	msg = rest[index+1:]
+	return
+}
+
+// leftPad returns a new slice of length size. The contents of input are right
+// aligned in the new slice.
+func leftPad(input []byte, size int) (out []byte) {
+	n := len(input)
+	if n > size {
+		n = size
+	}
+	out = make([]byte, size)
+	copy(out[len(out)-n:], input)
+	return
+}